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Summary 
The over-representation of Indigenous Australians in prison continues to be a serious 
problem, even a decade after the recommendations of the Royal Commission into 
Aboriginal Deaths in Custody were handed down. The greatest leverage for reducing 
Indigenous imprisonment rates appears to lie in reducing the rate at which Indigenous 
persons appear in court rather than in reducing the rate at which convicted offenders 
are sentenced to imprisonment. This would mean not only diverting Indigenous 
defendants away from court, but reducing the rate at which Indigenous persons are 
arrested, through using alternatives to arrest, reducing the rate at which they offend or 
re-offend and addressing inappropriate differential treatment of Indigenous persons by 
the criminal justice system. 
A unique opportunity to analyse the processes underlying Indigenous arrest is provided 
by the 1994 National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Survey (NATSIS) data, with 
its unprecedented range of socioeconomic and cultural data. This report documents the 
factors associated with Indigenous arrest, rather than directly analysing the nature of 
offence (re-offence) or differential treatment by the police. 
Data and method 
Criminological research points to several factors that are likely to explain the 
Indigenous arrest rate: 
• sex; 
• age; 
• Torres Strait Islanders, a distinct ethnic group within Indigenous Australia with 
relatively low arrest rates; 
• the adequacy and availability of police services; 
• economic predictors of arrest, such as labour force status and education, which 
attempt to capture the labour market options of individuals and the capacity to 
communicate with various actors in the criminal justice system; 
• alcohol consumption; 
• the extent of verbal and physical abuse in Indigenous community; 
• health conditions; 
• socioeconomic conditions within families—particularly the removal of children from 
their parents (sometimes known in the Indigenous context as the ‘stolen 
generation’); 
• housing need (included as an alternative measure of income poverty which tends to 
be poorly measured for Indigenous Australians); and 
• positive and negative peer group influences. 
The NATSIS had valid information on these factors for 10,235 respondents aged 13 
years and over (e.g., the poor quality of information available for prisoners meant that 
such data was not used in the main analysis). This data is used to estimate the 
probability of arrest for various groups of people to assess the relative importance of the 
factors underlying Indigenous arrest. The results are merely broadly indicative of the 
factors associated with arrest because of residual concerns about the direction of 
causality and measurement error. 
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Results 
The major factors underlying the high rates of Indigenous arrest include sex, labour 
force status, alcohol consumption, whether a person had been physically attacked or 
verbally threatened, various age factors, and the cluster of education variables: 
• males are 13.1 percentage points more likely to be arrested than females; 
• having a job (especially in non-Community Development Employment Projects 
(CDEP) scheme employment) appears to lower arrest rates by: reducing the time 
available for illegal activities, reducing immediate financial disadvantage and 
improving the ‘social capital’ of workers who are in a better position to engage with 
the mainstream non-CDEP economy. CDEP scheme participants are less likely to be 
arrested than Indigenous unemployed (8.1, and 13.1 percentage points); 
• alcohol consumption is one of the largest single factors underlying overall 
Indigenous arrest rates (12.8 percentage points); 
• having been physically attacked or verbally threatened increases arrest by a similar 
amount to the alcohol consumption (10.9 percentage points); 
• the probability of arrest peaks among 18 to 24 year-olds and then declines, being 
lowest among Indigenous people aged 45 years and over; and 
• with a few notable exceptions, education variables behave as predicted by 
criminological theory with the arrest rates declining as the level of schooling 
increases. 
Other factors examined also had a significant impact on Indigenous arrest rates: 
• Torres Strait Islanders are much less likely to have been arrested (7.7 percentage 
points); 
• family environment also had a significant effect on arrest. Among these, living with 
non-Indigenous people and being taken from one’s natural family are significantly 
associated with Indigenous arrest rates (-2.5 and 5.1 percentage points, 
respectively); 
• the housing variables increased Indigenous arrest by between 2.5 and 3.0 
percentage points; 
• long-term health conditions are also associated with a higher rate of arrest (2.4 
percentage points); 
• the adequacy and availability of police services also had a significant impact, albeit 
relatively small compared to that in other studies; 
• not only do negative peer influences increase Indigenous arrest but positive role 
models may also reduce arrests; and 
• while dependents exerted no influence on overall arrest, the responsibilities (and the 
tighter time constraints) associated with parenthood and guardianship affected 
certain categories of female arrest (i.e., arrests for drinking-related charges and 
theft). 
The overall results were robust, with the basic findings not changing substantially 
when the analysis was conducted separately for minors (under 18 year-olds), for each 
sex, or after prisoners were included in the analysis. The apparently small differences 
between the processes underlying male and female arrests points to cross-cultural or 
Indigenous-specific factors being more important than gender related issues. 
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The top six factors underlying the various categories of arrests (drinking-related, 
assaults, theft and outstanding warrants) are basically the same as those identified 
above. However, alcohol consumption and being a victim of physical attack or verbal 
threat are particularly important factors underlying arrests on drinking-related and 
assault charges. This would seem to confirm the suspicion that there is a cycle of 
violence and abuse in Indigenous communities which is probably related to alcohol 
consumption. 
Policy discussion 
Ensuring that Indigenous citizens stay out of the criminal justice system should be a 
priority for governments who are concerned about Indigenous wellbeing. Unfortunately, 
there are a limited number of policy instruments among the factors identified. For 
example, sex and age are not factors that will be responsive to policy intervention. 
However, it is important to take them into account in designing appropriate policy as 
attitudes and circumstances vary dramatically across demographic groups.  
The policy implications are complicated by the fact that ‘ feedback mechanisms’ have 
been identified where arrest reinforces disadvantage in several of these factors 
(especially, employment prospects and educational attainment). Any attempt to 
substantially reduce the high rates of unemployment among Indigenous people also 
needs to make inroads into Indigenous arrest. Education policy needs not only to 
improve the marketability of the Indigenous workforce, but to facilitate the citizenship 
skills required to operate in both the Indigenous and non-Indigenous domains. 
Notwithstanding such feedback, improving labour market options of Indigenous people 
should markedly reduce the arrest rate. 
The links between alcohol and crime, especially violent crime, are well documented. 
Substantial progress needs to be made on substance abuse problems before the cycle of 
violence in Indigenous communities can be broken. Restrictions on liquor supply are 
consistently nominated as producing the most tangible results in terms of reducing 
alcohol-related harm among Indigenous Australians. 
Family and social factors are less amenable to direct policy intervention. Indeed, the 
misconceived policy interventions that led to the ‘stolen generation’ appear to be a 
major factor underlying Indigenous arrest rates. The negative effects of such policies are 
likely to be driven by the traumatic disruption to family life and the loss of culturally 
appropriate parenting skills. Early intervention approaches to dealing with risk factors 
associated antisocial and criminal behaviour appears to offer a promising avenue for 
policy action. It is important that Indigenous people have some control over how family 
services are provided (e.g., the need for Indigenous carers for Indigenous clients is often 
identified as an issue). The needs of children of Indigenous prisoners, especially those 
from country areas, should also be taken into account if the risk of delinquent 
behaviour is to be minimised.  
The analysis in this paper should be reassessed when the Indigenous General Social 
Survey is conducted in 2002. The advantage of this survey is that analogous data will 
be collected for the non-Indigenous population, thus providing a national benchmark 
against which to compare the Indigenous analysis.  
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Background 
The over-representation of Indigenous Australians in prison continues to be a serious 
problem, even a decade after the recommendations of the Royal Commission into 
Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (RCADC) were handed down (Baker 2001; Williams 
2001).1 For example, Baker (2001) finds that it stems initially from their higher rate of 
appearance at court, but is amplified at the point of sentencing, with Indigenous 
offenders sentenced to imprisonment at almost twice the rate of non-Indigenous 
persons. The violent nature of the offences for which Indigenous people are convicted 
and the greater likelihood of Indigenous persons having prior convictions were also 
found to contribute to their higher rate of imprisonment. Baker (2001) concludes that 
the greatest leverage for reducing Indigenous imprisonment rates appears to lie in 
reducing the rate at which Indigenous persons appear in court rather than in reducing 
the rate at which convicted offenders are sentenced to imprisonment. This would mean 
not only diverting Indigenous defendants away from court, but reducing the rate at 
which Indigenous persons are arrested, through both using alternatives to arrest and 
reducing the rate at which they offend or re-offend. 
Several important research questions remain unanswered. Why do Indigenous people 
appear in court at a rate five times higher than the rest of the population? Why are 
Indigenous persons more likely to appear for (and be convicted of) certain types of 
offences? (Baker 2001). Clearly factors such as the over-representation of Indigenous 
persons at arrest, the nature of Indigenous offending and re-offending, and the 
differential treatment of Indigenous persons by the criminal justice system will all have 
a part to play.2  
The 1994 National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Survey (NATSIS) data, with its 
unprecedented range of socioeconomic and cultural data, provides a unique 
opportunity to analyse the processes underlying Indigenous arrest. The NATSIS was 
undertaken by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) in response to a 
recommendation by the RCADC that extra statistical information on the Indigenous 
population was required in order to better understand the range of factors contributing 
to deaths in custody (Commonwealth of Australia 1991).  
Another reason to conduct this research is that NATSIS provides an opportunity to 
examine predictors of arrest within the Indigenous population. Policy needs to be 
informed by an understanding of what distinguishes those who are likely to be arrested 
from other Indigenous Australians. Statistical models can be used to provide a solid 
basis for assigning relative importance, or weights, to the various policies which 
attempt to reduce the incidence of Indigenous arrest. 
It is important to recognise that this paper builds on the NATSIS analysis in the 1997 
Office of Evaluation and Audit (OEA) report (1997) and Borland and Hunter (2000). The 
OEA report provided one of the first regression analyses of the NATSIS, albeit on a 
restricted sample consisting solely of unemployed and Community Development 
Employment Projects (CDEP) scheme respondents.3 The OEA’s focus on the CDEP 
scheme is understandable given that they were examining the effect of the scheme 
relative to its nearest alternative (in terms of labour force status).4 This paper 
generalises the OEA results to the Indigenous population as a whole, and uses the full 
potential of the public NATSIS sample to describe the factors underlying Indigenous 
arrest rates. 
Broadhurst (1997: 417) argues that there is ‘clear statistical support for the proposition 
that ‘race’ or Aboriginality increases the risk of arrest’. However, he also cautions that 
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‘Aboriginality may be a factor or variable that catches a number of stigmatising 
characteristics (such as truancy, unemployment, substance abuse) and in this sense 
operates as a shorthand ‘predictive’ model for police’. Given that this study is confined 
to Indigenous respondents, it largely avoids addressing this problem. This is not to say 
that the effect of this style of ‘policing’ is eliminated, merely that all people in the survey 
will be, to a greater or lesser degree, subject to similar sorts of police attitude. Of 
course, if police pay greater attention to all Indigenous people, then they may notice the 
behaviour(s) of particular Indigenous persons which they believe may be related to 
offences, irrespective of the truth of the matter.  
This paper confines itself to examining the economic and social factors underlying the 
various types of arrest experienced by Indigenous people. That is, it examines arrest 
rather than analysing the nature of offence (re-offence) or differential treatment by the 
police. While the categories of arrest in the NATSIS are broadly based on various 
offences, it is important not to conflate the two concepts since people can be arrested 
without actually having committed an offence. The next section introduces the data and 
method required to identify the relative importance of various predictors of arrest before 
sketching out a rudimentary profile of Indigenous arrests and highlighting, wherever 
possible, the relevant comparisons with the experience of other Australians.5 After a 
detailed analysis of the effect of various factors on the incidence and category of arrest, 
the concluding section discusses the policy options for addressing the high rate of 
arrest among Indigenous Australians.   
Data and method 
Predictors of arrest 
Broadhurst (1997: 413–15) provides an extensive theoretical description of the 
determinants of criminal activity that underlie the high rates of Indigenous arrest. 
Based on these theoretical considerations, several variables have been used to predict 
which Indigenous people are most at risk of arrest, including: gender, age, Aboriginality 
of family, education, CDEP scheme employment, whether taken away from natural 
parents, availability of Indigenous police aides, alcohol consumption, region of 
residence and institutional factors specific to each State’s criminal justice system (OEA 
1997). Borland and Hunter (2000) also show that other factors are important including 
whether an Indigenous person: is a Torres Strait Islander, has voted in a recent 
election, or has had a long-term health condition. This section discusses the 
relationship of each of these predictors with Indigenous arrest, before introducing 
several household level factors omitted from existing empirical studies.  
The distinct gender and demographic patterns of arrest are well known with male youth 
being particularly likely to have been arrested. Consequently, variables indicating 
whether or not a person was male and the broad age group of a respondent are 
included in the analysis.  
Torres Strait Islanders are a distinct ethnic group within Indigenous Australia. Given 
there is substantial evidence that Torres Strait Islanders have relatively low arrest rates 
and higher socioeconomic status, it is important to use a separate ethnicity variable for 
this group (ABS/CAEPR 1997: 25).  
One reason why Torres Strait Islanders appear to have low arrest rates may be that 
many of them live in remote parts of Australia. Not only are there fewer police to arrest 
people in such areas, but the general lack of infrastructure interacts with other aspects 
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of the social and economic life of residents which, in turn, may be reflected in arrest 
rates. Such influences are captured using several geographic variables that indicate 
whether a person resides in either a capital city, other urban, rural or remote area.  
One indicator of whether police services in a community are culturally appropriate is if 
it has either Indigenous police aides or liaison officers. Given the emphasis on adequacy 
and availability of police services in determining the incidence of arrest, it is desirable 
to include a direct measure of access to police. The predictor chosen from the NATSIS 
data was whether a respondent lived within 50 kilometres of a police station.  
The economic predictors of arrest attempt to capture the labour market options of 
individuals and their capacity or willingness to communicate with various actors in the 
criminal justice system. For example, being employed may increase access to resources 
and hence reduce incentive for ‘economic’ crime. While the prolonged experience of 
unemployment may increase the time available to commit an offence, it may also 
increase an individual’s dissatisfaction with Australian society (Hunter 2000b). CDEP 
scheme employment and a not-in-the-labour-force category are included separately as 
predictors because they reflect the labour market options of respondents (Hunter & 
Gray 1999).  
Education is included in the analysis because it captures both aspects of the economic 
predictors of arrest. Well educated individuals are more likely to have skills that 
improve their employability and enhance their ability to communicate within the 
criminal justice system. Two categories of education variables were included in the 
analysis: highest level of schooling completed (less than 6 years, years 6 to 9, year 10 or 
11, year 12, and still at school), and whether a respondent had any post-school 
qualification.  
Given the preponderance of drinking-related offences among Indigenous Australians, it 
is also necessary to include a control for alcohol consumption. The variable chosen was 
whether a respondent had ever drunk alcohol.6  
A related problem in the Indigenous community is the extent of verbal and physical 
abuse (National Crime Prevention 2001). While obviously not all violence originates 
within the community (e.g., there is both anecdotal and statistical evidence of police 
harassment of Indigenous people), if a cycle of violence is created, then related offences 
are likely to be perpetrated and prosecuted. The relevant NATSIS variable, which 
measures whether a person had been physically attacked or verbally threatened, 
provides an adequate, although imperfect, proxy for such factors (Carcach & Mukherjee 
1996). Since such people are, in some sense, a ‘victim’ of other people’s behaviour, they 
will be referred to by the shorthand of ‘victim’ for the remainder of this paper. 
Long-term health problems may also be related to Indigenous arrest. Health conditions 
may arise indirectly from behaviours associated with arrest (e.g., alcohol consumption). 
Alternatively, prolonged health problems could lead to enforced idleness and poverty, 
thus increasing the opportunity and incentive to engage in criminal activities. 
Family influences are likely to be prominent factors associated with arrest (National 
Crime Prevention 1999). Living in a family with dependents will tend to reduce arrest 
rates because of the moderating effect of extra family responsibilities. Alternatively, 
living in a family with non-Indigenous people may reduce the incidence of arrest to the 
extent that such people tend to have better economic prospects. That is, this ‘mixed 
family’ variable is included to pick up socioeconomic factors not captured by other 
predictors.  
4 HUNTER 
C E N T R E  F O R  A B O R I G I N A L  E C O N O M I C  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H  
Another family-based predictor of arrest is whether an individual was taken from their 
natural family. Members of the ‘stolen generation’ who were taken from their natural 
families have experienced social dislocation and alienation, which anecdotal evidence 
suggests has significantly increased contact with the criminal justice system 
(Commonwealth of Australia 1997: 12–16). The disruption to family life entailed in 
taking children from parents has been identified as a significant risk factor underlying 
arrest (National Crime Prevention 1999). 
While there are valid theoretical reasons for believing that poverty will be associated 
with arrest, there is no evidence of any significant relationship in any of the existing 
empirical literature (OEA 1997). One explanation for this may arise from the fact that 
raw income, which was used in the OEA study, is likely to be a poor proxy for poverty. 
The real cost of raising large Indigenous families needs be reflected in the ‘equivalence 
scale’ used to adjust income for the size and composition of a family. Better measures 
of poverty can be derived by dividing raw family incomes by standard equivalence 
scales, such as the 1983 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) scale.7 Following Mitchell’s (1991) ‘median approach’, this study defines 
someone as poor if they earn less than 50 per cent of Australia’s median income for the 
period in question.  
While this approach should provide a more robust measure of Indigenous poverty than 
raw family income, there are several reasons why one might expect poverty to be a less 
significant factor than it is in general studies of the Australian population. For example, 
Hunter (1999; 2001) finds that there is little relationship between arrest and poverty. 
One explanation for this is that measurement error is particularly prominent in 
Indigenous households where income sharing arrangements may be at variance to the 
Australian norms (Hunter 2001). In view of these measurement issues, it is worth 
considering using housing variables as a more direct measure of Indigenous poverty. 
Variables that measure the housing stock (proxied by houses with an average of two 
residents per bedroom) and housing quality (captured by whether major household 
utilities are available and working) are included in the analysis to capture the effect of 
living without adequate access to resources.  
Apart from the household-level variables, other factors have been included in some 
modified form in previous empirical analysis. The last two household-level variables 
included in the formal analysis attempt to capture the effect of peer group or social 
influences within the household. Living with others who have been recently arrested 
might be used to capture negative peer group influences on arrest prospects. Positive 
role models might be provided by people who constructively engage with the wider 
society, proxied here by voting in a recent election. Voting behaviour is a standard 
measure of the extent of social networks in the social capital literature (Hunter 2000a).  
In line with the recommendation in Appendix C, several other variables are included to 
ensure that all available information on Indigenous arrest is analysed. That is, extra 
variables are included where a large number of NATSIS respondents would otherwise be 
excluded from the formal analysis for not providing enough information. For example, 
one variable used indicates those households where residents are not sure whether 
there are any Indigenous police aides in the community. Another variable captures 
those respondents who did not state whether they had completed secondary school. A 
separate variable was also constructed to indicate households where valid income data 
was not available for all residents. While such variables are not easy to interpret, it is 
important that respondents are not excluded unnecessarily, especially if the resulting 
variable is of relatively minor importance.  
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The NATSIS sample 
The sample design for the NATSIS was a multi-stage stratified random sample based on 
Census Collection Districts. The survey covered a total of 4,205 households, which 
yielded 15,726 Indigenous respondents, 3,076 non-Indigenous persons living in the 
same household as an Indigenous person and 158 prisoners (ABS 1996).  
Not all NATSIS respondents were used in the analysis. First, only people aged 13 years 
and over were included because they are the only ones for whom data on arrest is 
collected.8 Second, non-Indigenous respondents were excluded because only a small 
portion of the necessary data is collected from them. Finally, 158 persons who were in 
jail at the time of the survey were considered for the analysis because they are, almost 
by definition, an important part of the population of Indigenous arrests—representing 
1.8 per cent of the total sample.9 However, given the mandatory constraints on 
prisoners’ freedom and the way such constraints affect the interpretability of the data, 
the reported multi-variate analysis excludes this group. After imposing these 
restrictions a sample of 10,235 Indigenous persons remained. A sensitivity analysis 
which includes Indigenous prisoners was also conducted and is provided in the text 
where it differs substantially from the reported results. 
Validating NATSIS data on arrest 
One issue arising when analysing arrest data from a self-response survey is the 
possibility of under-reporting of arrest. For example, Freeman (1994: 16) notes that it is 
common to find under-reporting of crime in the United States by black youth. To 
examine potential under-reporting of arrest of Indigenous Australians, one is restricted 
to a comparison between NATSIS data and official police data for Western Australia as 
this is the only State that reports official police arrest data disaggregated between 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous persons. Estimates based on the official police data 
indicate that the proportion of Indigenous persons arrested in Western Australia 
between 1990 and 1994 was about 24.6 per cent.10 The NATSIS results indicate that 
25.4 per cent of Western Australians aged 13 years and over had been arrested in this 
period (ABS 1995: 60).11 The closeness of the estimates of the proportion of the 
Indigenous population arrested in Western Australia from the NATSIS and official police 
data gives us some confidence that, at least at an aggregate level, under-reporting of 
arrest is not a serious problem in NATSIS data. 
Modelling NATSIS arrest 
The periodic and relatively rare nature of arrest means that data must be collected over 
or relate to a reasonable period, usually using respondents’ memory to recall 
interactions with the police. The designers of NATSIS opted for a questionnaire that 
asked whether a respondent had been arrested in the last five years. This pragmatic 
decision has important implications for the empirical model used to capture the factors 
associated with arrest. 
1it
5-t=
1-t=
*
2i2
5-t=
1-t=
1i2
*
1it u + )y(  +)X( = y ∑∑ τ
τ
τ
τ
τ
τ γα  (1) 
Equation 1 specifies that an individual’s arrest record over the previous five years, y1it*, 
depends on variables which may be simultaneously determined with arrest (known in 
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the econometric literature as endogenous regressors), )y( 
5-t=
1-t=
*
2i∑τ
τ
τ , a set of other 
explanatory factors, )X(
5-t=
1-t=
1i∑τ
τ
τ , and a normally distributed error term, 1itu .  
The reason for distinguishing endogenous regressors from other explanatory variables 
is that they can complicate the statistical model by inducing an ‘endogeneity’ bias into 
the magnitude and significance of the measured influence of the factors underlying 
arrest. Several of the proposed explanatory variables may be endogenous with arrest 
including labour force status, education, drinking behaviour and income. All other 
variables used in the regression analysis are unproblematic, at least in terms of the 
potential for endogeneity bias.  
The issues surrounding endogenous variables can also be conceived in terms of reverse 
causality, which receives a detailed examination in the next section. The problems 
arising from such factors have been minimised or eliminated by the careful 
construction of the relevant explanatory variables. 
Since the assumptions underlying the standard regression technique, Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS), break down when analysing a discrete or dichotomous dependent 
variable, it is necessary to use another technique to estimate Equation 1. One widely 
used estimator for dichotomous variables is utilised in this paper, the standard probit 
estimator (Greene 2000). This technique is appropriate as long as the possibility of 
‘endogeneity’ bias has been eliminated. 
Reverse causality and the differential timing of arrest and explanatory 
variables 
The issue of reverse causality between potentially ‘endogenous’ or jointly determined 
variables clearly needs to be discussed. Unfortunately, given that the arrest variables in 
NATSIS refer to behaviour or outcomes in the previous five years and other variables 
are largely contemporaneous means that it is almost impossible to identify the extent 
that causation runs from arrest back to these potentially endogenous variables. In any 
case, the econometric techniques involved to control for reverse causality require that 
suitable instruments are available and this is probably not the case.12 Therefore, the 
correlations identified in this paper are merely broadly indicative of the factors 
associated with arrest. Furthermore, given the temporal orderings of the arrest and 
most other explanatory variables, these factors can only be considered predictors of 
arrest to the extent that they are relatively permanent for individuals. That is, such 
factors are unlikely to change over time because of either migration or the intrinsically 
dynamic nature of such factors.  
It is important not to overstate the problem of reverse causality. For example, joint 
estimation of employment and arrest in Borland and Hunter (2000) indicated that there 
was no significant endogeneity problem. If this result is replicated between arrest and 
other labour force states, then the latter can be classified as an ‘unproblematic’ (non-
endogenous) explanatory variable.  
Another reason to discount causality issues, is that variables can be constructed to 
ensure that they are, by definition, capturing relatively permanent factors. For example, 
alcohol consumption is measured in this paper by whether a person has ever drunk 
alcohol before. In this way, it makes it unlikely that reverse causality is an issue, except 
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perhaps for very young respondents for whom the experience of arrest may influence 
drinking behaviour by putting them into contact with the ‘wrong crowd’.  
Also, the preference for using housing stock and quality variables to proxy for the 
effects of poverty, as opposed to income, is likely to reduce or eliminate the potential for 
bias as the relationship between arrest and housing variables is at best indirect. In any 
case, since Borland and Hunter (2000) show that arrest is not significantly correlated 
with Indigenous wage income, endogeneity bias is not likely to be an issue for family 
income or any transformations of that income (e.g., OECD measures of equivalent 
income).  
The final rationale for ignoring potential joint causality of certain variables is that it is 
conventional to do so. Notwithstanding sound theoretical reasons for expecting that 
education and economic status are jointly determined, education is routinely included 
as a standard explanatory variable in wage equations estimated by economists. If this 
protocol is followed, then we are effectively assuming that education is not influenced 
by the experience of arrest. This assumption probably breaks down for younger 
respondents and it is therefore important to separately analyse Indigenous minors and 
older NATSIS respondents (Hunter & Schwab 1998). Given the large differences in 
arrest profiles of males and females, the empirical analysis will also be conducted 
separately by sex. 
Concerns about endogeneity were not ignored altogether. Despite the fact that Carcach 
and Mukherjee (1996) identified Indigenous perceptions of police of being correlated 
with arrests, such variables were omitted from the analysis because it was not possible 
to be confident that an ‘endogeneity bias’ would distort the measured effect of other 
factors.  
As noted above, information on all explanatory variables in previous time periods are 
not available—thus it is necessary to include explanatory variables from the current 
time period to proxy for effects from previous time periods. For some variables which 
are relatively ‘permanent’—such as age, educational attainment, whether taken from 
natural family, and whether ever drank alcohol—use of ‘current’ period variables should 
not cause a significant loss of information. On the other hand, high rates of geographic 
mobility in the Indigenous population are likely to mean that variables related to 
current location may be less accurate as proxies for previous location (i.e., they may be 
mismeasured).13 Measurement error of non-endogenous variables can itself be a source 
of bias in the arrest estimates (Greene 1997). However, the use of broad geography to 
describe Indigenous arrest will minimise this problem, especially if people tend to move 
within a type of area (e.g., from one remote area to another).  
The differential timing of arrest and explanatory variables has implications for the 
possibility of endogeneity bias and measurement error. Working on the presumption 
that these issues have been fully addressed in the data construction and specification, 
the paper will proceed with a standard probit regression analysis of Indigenous arrest.  
Institutional factors 
Before moving to the results section, it is necessary to briefly reflect on institutional 
factors left out of the specification. The omission of information on State or Territory of 
residence from the publicly available NATSIS data means that it is not possible to 
directly control for important institutional features of the criminal justice system that 
vary between jurisdictions. Another reason is that the inclusion of further data on 
residence will exacerbate the measurement error problems for the geographic variables. 
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Appendix A shows that analysis of Indigenous arrests based on the NATSIS appears to 
be insensitive to the inclusion of the State and Territory dummy variables. Using an 
otherwise identical specification to that used in OEA (1997), the size and significance of 
the effect of the major factors underlying arrest among Indigenous unemployed and 
CDEP scheme workers remain largely unchanged. Consequently, the influence of State 
and Territory is adequately picked up by other variables, especially the ‘mixed family’ 
variable (Appendix A).14  
Results 
A profile of Indigenous arrest  
The NATSIS informs us that about one in five Indigenous Australians were arrested at 
least once in the five years before the survey. For example, Table 1 shows that 31.6 per 
cent of males and 9.4 per cent of females over 13 years old had been arrested in the last 
five years. Of those arrested the average number of arrests is approximately 3.0 for 
males and 2.3 for females (see Table 2). While youths aged 18 years and over tend to 
have the highest incidence of arrest, there is an ‘inverted U’ profile with the very 
youngest and oldest age groups tending to have very low arrest rates. In general, males 
are between three and four times more likely to have been arrested than females in 
each age group. The exception to this is males under 18 years old who are over five 
times more likely to have been arrested than under-aged females.  
Table 1. Profiles of Indigenous arrest by age and sex (% of age group), 1994 
 Broad age group  
 13 to 17 18 to 24 25 to 34 35 to 44 45 plus Total 
Males       
Arrested in last 5 years 13.9 46.8 43.7 31.0 13.3 31.6 
Reason for last arrest   
Drinking-related arrest 1.2 22.9 24.8 17.9 7.7 16.1 
Outstanding warrant 1.9 8.1 9.0 5.1 2.1 5.7 
Assault 0.7 7.8 8.7 3.9 2.1 5.1 
Theft 6.3 9.6 5.3 2.4 0.2 5.0 
Females       
Arrested in last 5 years 2.7 16.7 12.7 9.4 3.3 9.4 
Reason for last arrest       
Drinking-related arrest 0.8 8.2 6.1 3.8 2.5 4.5 
Outstanding warrant 0.2 1.5 2.3 0.9 0.2 1.1 
Assault 0.2 3.3 2.8 2.0 0.3 1.8 
Theft 1.1 2.1 1.9 0.4 0.0 1.2 
Note: Drinking-related arrests encompass drinking in public and drink driving. These profiles are weighted 
to reflect the Indigenous population in 1994.  
Table 1 also shows that the most common reasons for arrest relate to intoxication—
16.1 per cent of males and 4.5 per cent of females had charges for drink driving or 
drinking in public in their most recent arrest in the previous five years. While about 
three-quarters of drinking-related male arrests had been charged with ‘drinking in 
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public’, almost all such female arrests were associated with this offence (Hunter & 
Borland 1999: 3).15  
In general, in their respective age groups, males tend to be between three and four 
times more likely to be arrested for the various offences than females. Males are even 
more likely to be arrested for outstanding warrants than females. For example, both 
teenage and older males (aged 45 and over) are about ten times more likely to be 
arrested for that offence than females in their respective age groups. In contrast, 
relatively speaking, males are much less likely to be arrested for assault than females 
being only (sic) 2.8 times more likely to be arrested for this offence overall (5.1 per cent 
compared to 1.8 per cent). Notwithstanding some variation, Indigenous male arrest 
rates are scaled up by a factor of three or four. 
As shown in Table 1, the other apparent difference between the sexes is that female 
arrest rates peak a little earlier (at between 18 and 24 years) for most arrest categories, 
with the exception of outstanding warrants. Males tend also to have relatively high rates 
of arrest in the next oldest age group. Indeed, with the exception of theft, all categories 
of male arrest peak in the 25 to 34 years age group. This exception is not surprising in 
itself given that arrest for theft is more concentrated among Indigenous youth than any 
other form of arrest. 
Table 2. Number of arrests (if arrested) in last five years by age and sex, 
1994 
 Broad age group  
 13 to 17 18 to 24 25 to 34 35 to 44 45 plus Total 
Males 2.6 3.5 3.3 2.7 2.3 3.0 
Females 2.6 2.5 2.3 2.1 1.5 2.3 
Note: Average number of arrests is for the subset of persons arrested in the previous five years. Persons 
with ten or more arrests were assumed to have ten arrests. Drinking-related arrests encompass 
drinking in public and drink driving. These profiles are weighted to reflect the Indigenous population 
in 1994. 
Table 2 shows that the average number of male arrests (given a person was arrested at 
least once) also displays an ‘inverted U’ profile across age groups, although the curve is 
somewhat flatter than that of Table 1. For example, the number of male arrests in the 
respective age groups only varies between 2.3 and 3.5. While the average number of 
arrests among females declines with age, the largest number of arrests in the last five 
years is for Indigenous females aged between 13 and 17 (arrested 2.6 times). This is 
consistent with a pattern of arrests which peak in an earlier age group for females.  
Table 3. Arrest rate per thousand population by sex and Aboriginality in 
Western Australia, 1994  
 Male Female Male/ 
female ratio 
Indigenous  313.8 116.6 2.7 
Non-Indigenous  32.1 6.4 5.0 
Indigenous/Non-Indigenous ratio 9.8 18.2  
Notes: The population estimates used were calculated for those aged 10 or more. This is the age of criminal 
responsibility in Western Australia (Ferrante & Loh 1996: 40). Arrest rates calculated using police 
apprehension data from Ferrante and Loh (1996: 49), estimated residential populations for Western 
Australia from ABS (2000) and Indigenous population projections from ABS (1995: 94). The 
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differences in these arrest rates from those reported in Ferrante and Loh (1996: 39) arise because of 
the more accurate estimates of the 1994 Indigenous population available in ABS (1995: 94; 2000).  
Western Australian data also shed some light onto the potential role of gender in 
Indigenous arrest (Table 3). ABS (1995) showed that Indigenous males were about 
three-and-a-half times more likely to have been arrested in the last five years than 
Indigenous females. This is roughly consistent with the sex ratio reported in the last 
column of Table 3 with Indigenous males being 2.7 times more likely to have been 
arrested than Indigenous females. In contrast, the ratio of male to female arrest rates 
among non-Indigenous Western Australians was exactly 5.0. That is, Indigenous arrest 
rates are high for both males and females, but especially high for Indigenous females. 
Stated another way, the differential risk of an Indigenous male being arrested compared 
to other Western Australian males was exactly 9.8 in 1994. Indigenous females were at 
even greater risk, being 18.2 times more likely to be arrested than other females in 
Western Australia—almost twice that of males in that State. In contrast to popular 
belief, Indigenous males are better off in terms of arrest than Indigenous females, at 
least relative to their non-Indigenous counterparts. 
To summarise, over 20 per cent of the Indigenous people aged 13 years and over were 
arrested at least once during the five years before the survey. More than three times as 
many males were arrested than females. Almost 47 per cent of males aged between 18 
and 24 years were arrested at least once during the five years before NATSIS. About two 
in three arrests were for disorderly conduct and/or drink driving, and for outstanding 
warrants and breaches of orders.  
Preliminary analysis  
The purpose of this paper is to provide a more sophisticated description of factors 
associated with Indigenous arrest than is possible using simple cross tabulations. A 
multi-variate analysis of Indigenous arrest provides the prospect of identifying factors 
which continue to have a significant association even after the analyst controls for other 
factors. Preliminary analysis was conducted in order to refine the specification and 
ensure that only significant factors are reported in the final regression results. 
Extensive preliminary analysis on the role of poverty in Indigenous arrest was 
inconclusive. Indeed, living in a poor household was not significantly associated with 
Indigenous arrest until basic demographic and geographic factors were controlled for. 
However, if one includes labour force status then there is no significance influence from 
poverty. Note that the household factors such as housing conditions and social factors 
within households do not affect this result. That is, once the higher individual 
probability of not having a job is taken into account, the direct measure of household 
poverty is not significant and can be ignored. This result was replicated in all 
regressions estimated and the OECD measure of poverty was therefore omitted from the 
final results.  
Other variables were also introduced into the preliminary analysis but omitted from the 
reported results including, a broad indicator for having a post-school qualification and 
whether a person was still at school. The lack of significant effect of either of these 
variables means that education is captured solely by the number of years of secondary 
schooling completed.  
As a consequence of this preliminary analysis, three variables were omitted from the 
final specification, the OECD measure of poverty, post-school qualification and whether 
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a person was still at school. This final specification was used to estimate all reported 
results (see Table B1 for full list of variables). 
Defining marginal effects and the ‘reference person’  
The coefficients of a probit regression are extremely informative but are notoriously 
difficult to interpret. One statistic that is relatively easy to interpret is the ‘marginal 
effect’ of each explanatory variable. This involves estimating the change in the predicted 
probability of arrest arising from a given change in a variable, holding the value of the 
other variables constant. Since the effect of changes in the explanatory variables on the 
probability of arrested varies with the value of all the explanatory variables in the 
model, it is essential that marginal effects are measured at values which are 
representative of a significant proportion of the population.  
The coefficients from a probit regression, and frequently marginal effects, are 
interpreted relative to the variables left out of the model so that estimation can proceed. 
Such variables define the ‘base case’. The base case for the analysis in the rest of this 
paper is:   
• an Aboriginal female aged 18–24 years, 
• living outside a capital city but more than 50 kilometres from a police station,  
• whose community has access to Indigenous police aides/liaison officers, 
• is employed but not in the CDEP scheme,  
• who completed less than six years of schooling,  
• who has never drunk alcohol,  
• who has not been physically attacked or verbally threatened in the 12 months 
before the survey,  
• does not have a long-term health condition,  
• does not live in a family with dependent children or with non-Indigenous people,  
• has never been taken away from their natural family,  
• lives in a household with less than two persons per bedroom and where the basic 
utilities are in a working condition, and  
• other household members have neither been arrested in the previous five years nor 
have they voted in a recent government or ATSIC election.  
Since this base case is in no way representative of the overall Indigenous population, it 
is fortunate that marginal effects can be calculated using alternative values for the 
respective explanatory variables. Instead, the marginal effects are estimated using the 
average characteristics of the sample provided in Appendix B and the standard 
procedure described in Greene (1997). Therefore, the reference person for the 
calculated marginal effects is the average Indigenous person (in the NATSIS), rather 
than the base case. In each case the marginal effect is calculated as the difference in 
probability of arrest for a person with and without the specified characteristic, with all 
other characteristics fixed at average values. While no single person embodies the 
‘average’, this change means that the estimated marginal effects are more robust and 
are relevant to a greater number of people. 
12 HUNTER 
C E N T R E  F O R  A B O R I G I N A L  E C O N O M I C  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H  
All Indigenous arrest 
Table 4 reports the marginal effect of the various factors underlying Indigenous arrest. 
The first line describes the average probability of arrest for all Indigenous people over 
12 years of age (excluding prisoners). All other rows show the marginal effect on the 
average probability of arrest due to the presence of a particular factor. Unless otherwise 
stated, the benchmark for statistical significance in this paper is whether a statistic is 
significant at the 5 per cent level. 
Table 4. Marginal effects of factors underlying Indigenous arrest 
 All arrests Drinking-
related 
Assault Theft Outstanding 
warrant 
Average probability of being arrested in 
the previous 5 years 17.0 9.6 3.0 2.4 2.6 
Marginal effect of having a particular characteristic (%)    
Male 13.1* 4.7* 1.4* 1.3* 1.4* 
Torres Strait Islander -7.7* -2.8* -0.8* -0.5* -0.6* 
Aged between 13 and 17 -4.5* -3.8* -0.8* 1.0* -0.4* 
Aged between 25 and 34 -0.5 0.6 0.1 -0.3* 0.1 
Aged between 35 and 44 -4.8* -0.6 -0.8* -0.8* -0.3* 
Aged between 45 years and over -9.5* -2.6* -1.3* -1.1* -0.8* 
Live in a capital city 4.0* 0.6 0.0 0.3 1.0* 
Rural area  -3.5* -1.0* -0.9* -0.4* 0.0 
Remote area  -4.2* -0.9 -0.5 -0.5* -0.2 
Indigenous police aides in community  -1.5* -0.8* -0.5* -0.3* -0.1 
Within 50 kilometres of police station -5.1* -2.8* -0.4 -0.3 -0.2 
Work in CDEP scheme 8.1* 3.2* 0.8* 0.0 0.8* 
Unemployed 13.1* 4.0* 1.2* 0.9* 1.2* 
Not in the labour force 4.8* 1.3* 0.3 0.5* 0.9* 
Completed 6 to 9 years of schooling  9.2* 2.0* 1.6* 1.7* 1.2* 
Completed year 10 or 11  5.7* 0.9 0.6 0.9* 1.0* 
Completed year 12 0.7 -0.6 0.1 0.6 0.5 
Has drunk alcohol at least once 12.8* 7.2* 1.7* 0.7* 1.1* 
Physically attacked or verbally 
threatened 10.9* 4.0* 1.5* 0.6* 0.4* 
Long-term health condition 2.4* 0.6 0.7* 0.1 0.3* 
Lives with non-Indigenous persons  -2.5* -1.0* 0.0 -0.4* -0.4* 
Living in family with at least 1 
dependent -0.8 -0.6 0.0 -0.1 0.0 
Taken away from natural family 5.1* 0.9 0.4 0.4 0.5* 
Crowded house 2.5* 1.4* 0.5* 0.2 0.2 
Household utilities available and 
working -3.0* -0.4 -0.1 -0.4* -0.2 
Other householders arrested 3.6* 1.6* 0.5* 0.3* 0.3* 
Other householders voted -1.2 -0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 
Notes:  Marginal effect is the effect of having a particular characteristic relative to the reference 
characteristics listed in Table B2 (i.e., the average characteristics of the NATSIS sample). An asterisk 
denotes a marginal effect is significantly different from zero at the 5 per cent level.  
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Source: Based on regression coefficients in Appendix B. 
Overall, the marginal effects shown in Table 4 confirm the analysis in Borland and 
Hunter (2000) where the probability of arrest was found to be significantly higher for 
males, decreasing with age and years of high school, and to be lower for persons who 
were living in a mixed family, did not have a long-term health condition, had never 
drunk alcohol, lived in a remote region or in an urban area outside a capital city, or 
were Torres Strait Islanders. While their findings suggest that life cycle and human 
capital factors are important for explaining arrest, the probability of arrest is also 
strongly related to a person’s family and socioeconomic environment. This section 
provides a detailed description of Table 4 paying particular attention to variables 
omitted in Borland and Hunters’ analysis.  
Males are more likely to be arrested than females, being 13.1 percentage points more 
likely to be arrested. The differences between male and female coefficients mean that 
this differential will vary depending upon the relative endowments of males and females 
with this estimate probably providing a conservative estimate of the influence of gender. 
However, as noted above, the factors effecting arrests among Indigenous males and 
females are remarkably similar.  
Torres Strait Islanders are much less likely to have been arrested (7.7 percentage points 
less likely) than other Indigenous Australians. In contrast to Borland and Hunter 
(2000), the inclusion of under 15 year-olds in Table 4 induces an inverted U 
relationship with age whereby the probability of arrest first increases with age, then 
declines. The probability of arrest peaks among 18 to 24 year-olds and then declines, 
being lowest among Indigenous people aged 45 years and over. The oldest age group is 
9.5 percentage points less likely to be arrested than other NATSIS respondents. 
Arrests rates are significantly higher in capital cities compared to other urban areas, 
although the marginal effect is relatively small (4.0 percentage points). Indigenous 
arrest rates in rural and remote areas are significantly lower, but the size of the effect is 
again small (3.5 and 4.2 percentage points, respectively).  
The policing variables are relatively less significant than they were shown to be by 
Borland and Hunter (2000). For example, the presence of Indigenous police aides only 
reduces arrest, albeit a statistically significant reduction, by 1.5 percentage points. 
Living within 50 kilometres of a police station also has a significant marginal effect 
(reducing arrest by 5.1 percentage points), but it is not as important, in relative terms, 
as it was shown in the previous analysis. One explanation for this change in relative 
magnitude is that this study controls for labour force status, including CDEP scheme 
employment, which is concentrated in such areas. Notwithstanding the potential role of 
unobserved geographic factors, the fact that proximity to police actually significantly 
reduces the incidence of arrests means that one should not overemphasise the role of 
differential policing as a factor underlying Indigenous arrests.  
Households where there was no clear indication of whether or not Indigenous police 
aides were available also had a significantly lower probability of arrest (see Appendix B, 
Table B4). One explanation is that there would be less opportunity to find out whether 
specialist police services were provided to Indigenous people if relatively few community 
members had been arrested recently. Alternatively, if a person did not anticipate being 
arrested because the assessment of the probability of arrest is based on the (low) 
number of people around them who have been arrested, then they may have less 
incentive to seek out information about Indigenous police aides.   
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Relative to those in non-CDEP employment, other Indigenous people were more likely to 
have been arrested in the previous five years. This is consistent with the theory that 
having any job should lower arrest rates by reducing the time available for illegal 
activities, reducing immediate financial disadvantage and improving the ‘social capital’ 
of workers, who are in a better position to engage with the mainstream (non-CDEP) 
economy. Consistent with the OEA (1997) report, the marginal effect of CDEP scheme 
jobs is significantly less than for the Indigenous unemployed although it is about the 
same for as the not in the labour force group (8.1, 13.1 and 4.8 percentage points 
respectively). 
Other important factors underlying arrest are the educational outcomes, which are not 
straightforward to interpret. Compared to people with less than six years of schooling, 
those completing between six and nine years of education have very high rates of arrest 
(9.2 percentage points higher). However, the marginal effects of more education are 
significantly less, being only 0.7 percentage points for those who complete secondary 
school. 
Why do people who have not had any secondary schooling have relatively low rates of 
arrest? One possibility is that such people are concentrated in remote and rural areas 
that are lightly policed. That is, the omitted education variable is picking up 
unmeasured geographic factors or the relatively short history of colonisation for people 
with limited exposure to the mainstream educational system (i.e., probably in remote 
parts of Australia). The other education variables behave as predicted by various 
criminological theories, with the arrest rates declining as the level of schooling 
increases. 
Drinking of alcohol is one of the largest single factors underlying not only drinking-
related offences, but overall Indigenous arrest rates (12.8 percentage points). Clearly, 
alcohol consumption needs to be addressed if significant inroads are to be made into 
the over-representation of Indigenous people in the criminal justice system. 
While alcohol has a large impact, other factors have a similar, or greater, influence on 
arrest outcomes. In addition to the education variables or being unemployed, having 
been physically attacked or verbally threatened increases arrest by a similar amount to 
the alcohol consumption proxy (10.9 percentage points). One explanation is that being 
a ‘victim’ is likely to be associated with situations which lead to police being called on to 
intervene. Another is that there is a cycle of violence being perpetrated within the 
Indigenous community with persons who have been subjected to such violence and 
threats lashing out at others, possibly more vulnerable than themselves, in the local 
vicinity. 
Long-term health conditions are also associated with a significantly higher rate of 
arrest, although the marginal effect is much smaller than for many other factors (2.4 
percentage points).  
Several ‘ family’ variables also have a significant effect on arrest. Among these, living 
with non-Indigenous people and being taken from one’s natural family are significantly 
associated with Indigenous arrest rates (-2.5 and 5.1 percentage points, respectively). 
The former may be a result of the higher socioeconomic status of non-Indigenous family 
members, while the latter is probably a result of a sense of dislocation from a society 
which permitted these dubious practices to occur (Commonwealth of Australia 1997).  
Having been taken away from one’s natural family as a child is the major ‘ family’ 
influence. While a similar effect is likely to be found among the non-Indigenous 
population, the extent of the ‘stolen generation’ means that such effects will be more 
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widespread among Indigenous people being found among all strata of society and in all 
socioeconomic status groups (Hunter 2001). 
The other family variable is whether a respondent lives in a family with at least one 
dependent child. Given that dependents exerted no influence on overall male and 
female arrests, it is not surprising that the marginal effects are negligible (see Table 4). 
However, as indicated above, responsibilities (and the tighter time constraints) 
associated with parenthood and guardianship still affect certain categories of female 
arrest (i.e., arrests for drinking-related charges and theft). 
The housing stock variables are significant and have the expected sign (direction of 
influence). For example, living in a crowded house with more than two residents per 
bedroom increases arrest rates by 2.5 percentage points. The quality of the housing 
stock also matters, with residents of households where all the basic household utilities 
work have a significantly lower arrest rate (3.0 percentage points). 
The ‘peer group’ or social influences within the household also significantly affect 
Indigenous arrest. Living in house where others have been arrested in the last five years 
increases Indigenous arrest by 3.6 percentage points. Not only do negative peer 
influences increase arrest but positive role models may also reduce arrests. For 
example, living with people who exercised their citizenship rights and voted in a recent 
election reduced arrest by 1.2 percentage points. However, this positive peer effect was 
only statistically significant at the 10 per cent level. 
Concerns about the NATSIS data quality for prisoners, arising from the constrained 
nature of their choices and consequent distortions in responses to various questions 
(e.g., labour force status) led to the exclusion of such data from the calculations 
underlying Table 4. In any case, the other data for prisoners were either of questionable 
quality (e.g., no prisoners indicated they had dependents) or driven by the assumptions 
required to derive them (e.g., prisons were assumed to have adequate housing). 
However, results were not substantively changed by including data on the 158 
prisoners in the NATSIS; the vast majority of whom had been arrested in the previous 
five years. The only noteworthy changes arose from the variables for dependents and 
positive peer group influences, which significantly affected all the estimated 
probabilities of arrest once prisoners were included, although the marginal effects were 
still rather small relative to those for other factors. Unfortunately, one cannot discount 
the possibility that these changes are a result of poor data quality or the assumptions 
used in data construction among prisoners. Given this qualification, more weight 
should be attached to the analysis that excludes prisoners. 
Analysis by sex and broad age group 
The profile of Indigenous arrests appears to point to substantial differences between 
various age groups. Given that the criminal justice system treats minors differently 
from adults, there are sound theoretical reasons to expect the factors underlying arrest 
to vary between 13 to 17 year-olds and persons aged 18 years and over. 
Notwithstanding, the empirical analysis by broad age group indicates that age-based 
differences were smaller than anticipated and can be explained in terms of the relatively 
small numbers of under-aged respondents in the NATSIS (see Appendix B). 
Only two coefficients estimated for adults were outside the confidence interval of the 
estimates for minors. The coefficients for the variables indicating the presence of 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous family members (i.e., so-called ‘mixed families’) and the 
quality of the housing stock were both significantly less for minors than among adults. 
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Since the incidence of mixed families varies significantly across Australian States and 
Territories, it may be capturing differences in the institutional treatment of juvenile 
offenders. In any case, the marginal effects of either of these variables are not 
significantly different between broad age groups.  
Similarly, there are relatively few differences between coefficients for males and females 
if one ignores the obvious differences in levels of arrest (see Appendix B). Consequently, 
marginal effects tend to be scaled up by the average differential in arrest data (i.e., 
males are about 3.4 times more likely to be arrested than females in the NATSIS).  
The main differences arise from the not completing secondary school, and several 
family, household and peer variables. For example, only completing six to nine years of 
school (relative to somebody who attended for less than 6 years) increases the 
probability of arrest by 14.7 percentage points for males—significantly more than the 
analogous marginal effect for females of 4.5 percentage points. Therefore, 
notwithstanding the significant differences in education coefficients for respective sexes, 
the marginal effect is roughly in proportion with the average differential. 
The differences between the sexes are less proportionate for some of the other variables. 
Being taken from one’s natural family has a significantly larger effect on males than on 
females; males being over five times more likely to have been arrested (10.1 and 2.0 per 
cent, respectively). Given that the effect of the stolen generation among females is only 
significant at the 10 per cent level, the effect of this factor is concentrated among 
Indigenous males. 
Two household level variables appear to have a significant effect on males but not on 
females. Living in a house where all the basic utilities work significantly reduces the 
probability of male arrest by 7.1 percentage points. The fact that such factors are 
measured at household level means that it is impossible to target policy specifically at 
male members of the household.  
The other, somewhat subtle, difference between the sexes arose from the pattern of 
significance of the presence of dependents in a family. While the presence of 
dependents did not effect the probability of arrest for males for any category of arrest, it 
significantly affected the probability of female arrest in the drinking-related and theft-
related arrests (marginal effects of –0.6 and 0.2 percentage points). That is, having 
children reduces female arrests arising from alcohol consumption, presumably because 
of the moderating effect of extra family responsibilities. Ironically, the small, but 
significant, increase in female arrests for theft may also result from extra 
responsibilities in that the economic incentive to steal may derive from a need to 
provide resources for children within poorer households. In contrast, males are not 
responsive to such pressures. However, even where the effect of dependents on the 
various types of arrest is significant for Indigenous females, the marginal effects are 
small in both relative and absolute terms. 
The result that dependents do not effect overall arrest rates among females would be a 
surprising result if it were found in an analysis of non-Indigenous females. The overall 
minor nature of the differences between this NATSIS analysis of male and female 
arrests points to cross-cultural or Indigenous-specific factors being more important 
than gender related issues. This is consistent with the ratios expressed in Table 3 
which indicated that, in terms of arrest rates, Indigenous females were worse off relative 
to their non-Indigenous counterparts than Indigenous males were relative to theirs.  
Having described the factors associated with overall Indigenous arrest, attention is now 
turned towards whether these factors vary for the various categories of arrest. Table 4 
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illustrates that the direction of influence of the factors is virtually identical for the 
various types of arrest with most difference arising from the size and significance of the 
marginal effects. Given the large and significant association of alcohol consumption and 
Indigenous arrest, it is appropriate that the focus is placed first on drinking-related 
arrest. 
Drinking-related offences 
Drinking-related offences dominate the overall arrest profiles of Indigenous Australians, 
comprising well over 50 per cent of all arrests (9.6 per cent out of the 17.0 per cent of 
the NATSIS respondents were arrested at least once in the last 5 years). Consequently, 
it is not surprising that drinking-related arrests are affected by similar factors to those 
identified above. The top five influences still include sex, labour force status, alcohol 
consumption, the ‘victim’ proxy, various age factors, and the cluster of education 
variables. However, there is some re-ranking within the most important factors, with 
alcohol consumption being the most important influence for such arrest (7.2 percentage 
points), displacing sex into second place (4.7 percentage points). The observation that 
alcohol consumption is strongly related to such arrest is no surprise since these factors 
are correlated by definition. 
The next most important factors are whether a person has been a ‘victim’ or is 
unemployed (both with marginal effects of 4.0 percentage points). The importance of the 
‘victim’ variable in drinking-related arrests means that the phenomena may be closely 
linked. 
The pattern of significance is also noteworthy. Several factors were not significant for 
drinking-related arrests but are significant for regression of all Indigenous arrests. 
Among the insignificant variables, those for capital cities and remote areas stand out. 
The correct interpretation of this is that drinking-related arrests are just as likely to 
occur in capital cities, other urban areas and remote areas, but they are slightly less 
likely to occur in rural areas (a marginal effect of 1.0 percentage points).  
Long-term health conditions and living in poor quality housing where basic household 
utilities do not work are also not significant. The influence of housing stock is through 
living in a crowded house. The result for health conditions is particularly interesting 
because it seems to suggest that health problems are not related to drinking-related 
arrest and, by inference, the consumption of alcohol, which is the largest single 
correlate with such arrests. This provides indirect evidence that health conditions are 
not strongly correlated with drinking behaviour and hence suggests that the influence 
of health problems may be through enforced idleness and poverty, which in turn 
increases the opportunity and incentive to engage in criminal activities.  
Assault 
The top six factors underlying Indigenous assaults are very similar to those identified 
above. In order of magnitude of effect, these include: alcohol consumption, education, a 
victim of physical attack or verbal threat, sex, age, and labour force status. While the 
link between consumption of alcohol and violence is well established, the prominence of 
this factor may be related to the public nature of much Indigenous drinking (Drugs and 
Crime Prevention Committee 2000).  
The probability of being arrested for assault declines with years of secondary school, 
being heavily concentrated among those with only a few years of secondary schooling 
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(marginal effect of 1.6 percentage points). However, Indigenous people with little 
education (having primary schooling or no formal schooling) have the least chance of 
this type of arrest. This may indicate that this variable is capturing variations in the 
State-based education systems. Alternatively, it may be picking up the detrimental 
effect of imposing a largely alien education system onto Indigenous peoples with the 
consequent impact on their cultures and social cohesion (Dawes 2000).  
After the effect of alcohol consumption (1.7 percentage points) and education, being 
physically attacked or verbally threatened and sex are the next most important factors 
underlying Indigenous arrests for assault (both having marginal effects of about 1.5 
percentage points). While being male is still an important factor underlying assault, it is 
relatively less important than it is for other forms of arrest. Unless the relatively small 
marginal effect of being male on assault is replicated in the non-Indigenous population, 
this confirms there are fewer gender differences in the Indigenous population than in 
the rest of the community. In terms of homicide, there is overwhelming evidence that 
extremely violent assaults are heavily concentrated among men in the larger 
community (Easteal 1993), and hence the difference between Indigenous women and 
other Australian women is likely to be larger than the analogous difference between 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous men. Notwithstanding the lack of an academic 
consensus on a causal relationship between alcohol and violent crime (Murdoch, Pihl 
and Ross 1990), there is a widespread belief that the relationship between alcohol use, 
aggression, and alcohol-related aggression over time are conditioned by gender (Nunes 
Dinis & Weisner 1997; White & Hansell 1996). This presumption does not appear to be 
valid for Indigenous Australians.  
As with the drinking-related arrest, being a victim of a physical attack or verbal assault 
is relatively more important than it is for other types of Indigenous arrest. This would 
seem to confirm the suspicion that there is a cycle of violence and abuse in Indigenous 
communities which is probably related to drinking-related behaviour. 
In addition to listing the significant factors underlying Indigenous assault, it is worth 
considering the insignificant factors, especially where there are some differences 
between the various types of arrest. There are no significant differences in the rate of 
arrest associated with assault charges in capital cities and other urban areas, although 
such arrests are less likely to occur in rural or remote areas. The other insignificant 
variables include living with non-Indigenous people, the quality of the housing stock 
and for peer group effects. The lack of significance of such factors probably indicates 
the low power of the statistical analysis when examining relatively infrequent 
occurrences (only 3.0 per cent of NATSIS respondents were arrested for assault) than it 
does about the influence of these factors. Indeed, with the exception of the proxy for 
positive role models, all these factors affected assault in the same direction as for other 
categories of arrests.  
Theft 
Given the relatively lower probability of arrest for theft (2.4 per cent), the marginal 
effects for such arrests will also be proportionately smaller, and probably less 
significant, than for most other types of arrests. The largest marginal effect was for 
completing between six and nine years of schooling, at 1.7 percentage points.  
The relative importance of education vis-à-vis other arrest categories is not surprising. 
Given that education is the largest single determinant of Indigenous wages (Daly 1995; 
Hunter & Gray 2001), and theft is often directly associated with an anticipated 
WORKING PAPER NO. 10 19 
C E N T R E  F O R  A B O R I G I N A L  E C O N O M I C  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H  
economic gain (if not caught and prosecuted), education and theft should be expected 
to have a relatively strong correlation. This is consistent with the fact that being 
unemployed and living in poor quality housing are both associated with a significantly 
higher probability of a theft-related arrest.  
The other variables with the six largest influences on Indigenous theft, in order of size 
of marginal effect, are: sex, age, labour force status, alcohol consumption, and the 
‘victim’ proxy. In contrast to the other forms of Indigenous arrest, drinking alcohol is 
relatively less important among people arrested for theft. That is, while alcohol 
consumption still has a significant effect on being arrested for theft, it is not as 
important as factors that can be directly related to an economic motivation for theft.  
The age profile of Indigenous theft-related arrests is another distinguishing feature of 
such arrests with minors being 2.1 percentage points more likely to be arrested for this 
offence than people aged over 45 years of age. Arrests for theft peaked in the youngest 
age group before gradually declining in the older groups. This is again consistent with 
an economic motive for theft given the lack of opportunities for economic independence 
among Indigenous youth. An alternative institutional based explanation is that 
Indigenous youth have less legal access to alcohol and therefore their composition of 
arrest will be biased away from those categories which are strongly associated with 
drinking behaviour.  
The lack of significant influence of certain factors such as long-term health conditions, 
distance to the nearest police station, and one of the proxies for peer group influences 
is again attributable to the power of the data to discriminate between alternative 
hypotheses when analysing infrequent occurrences. Even if the marginal effects were 
not significant in their own right, they were all in the direction predicted by the theory 
described above.  
Outstanding warrants 
An outstanding warrant could be characterised as a ‘second order’ arrest which relates 
to the failure to respond to a legal order, such as those arising from other categories of 
arrest. Notwithstanding, it is analysed in this section in order to provide insights into 
why many Indigenous Australians do not comply with legal orders (usually to attend 
court proceedings over another charge). While fewer Indigenous people are arrested for 
outstanding warrants than drinking-related charges or assault (2.6%, 9.6% and 3.0%, 
respectively), it is still a major factor underlying Indigenous interactions with the 
criminal justice system.  
The factors underlying arrest for an outstanding warrant are again similar to those 
identified for all Indigenous arrests. Like the other types of arrest, having completed 
year 12 does not lessen the impact on this form of arrest relative to those without any 
education. Stated another way, there is no significant decline in the probability of being 
arrested for an outstanding warrant in those completing secondary school. Given a 
common expectation that education informs students of the consequences of their 
actions and should provide them with the capability to deal with societal institutions, 
this is a surprising result. It calls into question the nature of the curriculum and the 
effectiveness of secondary school in imparting this ‘citizenship education’. Another more 
plausible explanation is that people with some education are more willing to argue their 
case with authorities. For example, a person with a secondary education may have been 
made aware of the injustice of a particular legal order, but probably will not have the 
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legal background to effectively challenge such orders. In this case, the problem may not 
be with the school system, but rather with the criminal justice system.  
Number of arrests 
Appendix C uses an identical set of variables to analyse the number of arrests among 
NATSIS respondents using several statistical models. With virtually no exception, the 
analysis of multiple arrests confirms the pattern of significance (and relative magnitude) 
of the factors underlying Indigenous arrests generally. Not only are economic, alcohol-
related, demographic, geographic, and human capital factors important, but the 
number of arrests is also strongly related to a person’s family, housing stock and 
socioeconomic environment.  
Discussion 
Indigenous Australians are over-represented at almost every stage of the criminal 
justice system. Studies by the Australian Institute of Criminology (AIC) and others have 
consistently produced evidence of the over-representation of Indigenous Australians at 
the different stages of the criminal justice system (Carcach & Mukherjee 1996).16  
Much of the public debate focuses solely on how to divert Indigenous people away from 
the court system and from jail (Cunneen & McDonald 1997). Unfortunately, unless the 
tide of Indigenous people being arrested is directly addressed, the success of these 
diversionary policies will be severely circumscribed with a disproportionate number of 
people getting through the cracks in the system, eventually ending up in court, and, 
ultimately, in jail. Couched in these terms, the crucial policy question is how to reduce 
the rate at which Indigenous Australians are arrested. 
The analysis in this paper provides a strong empirical and theoretical justification for 
the policy recommendations of the RCADC (Commonwealth of Australia 1991). In 
particular, ensuring that Indigenous citizens stay out of the criminal justice system 
should be a priority policy issue for governments who are concerned about Indigenous 
wellbeing. For example, the major factors underlying the high rates of Indigenous arrest 
include sex, labour force status, alcohol consumption, whether a person had been 
physically attacked or verbally threatened, various age factors, and the cluster of 
education variables. The policy implications of the analysis are complicated by the fact 
that feedback mechanisms have been identified where arrest reinforces disadvantage in 
several of these factors over the longer term. For example, Borland & Hunter (2000) and 
Hunter & Schwab (1998) examine the role of arrest in depressing Indigenous 
employment and educational attainment.  
Unfortunately, there are a limited number of independent policy instruments among 
these correlates of Indigenous arrests. For example, sex and age are not factors that will 
be responsive to policy intervention. However, it is important to take them into account 
in designing appropriate policy as attitudes and circumstances vary dramatically across 
demographic groups. Labour market programs, educational courses, and information 
dissemination need to take into account the requirements of the target audience (Taylor 
& Hunter 1996).  
The policy implications of the role of geographic location may not be immediately 
apparent. Other than encouraging mobility from areas of high arrest (which would be 
politically unpalatable and undesirable), policy could attempt to address structural 
difficulties in the regions affected by funding adequate infrastructure. Ironically, if the 
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above analysis can be taken at face value, building police stations closer to Indigenous 
communities may actually help reduce arrest rates. Certainly, provision of Indigenous 
aides in existing police stations will help achieve this result.  
As indicated above, both employment and education are implicated in a vicious cycle, 
which reinforces Indigenous over-representation among Australian arrests. Any future 
attempt to substantially reduce the high rates of unemployment and idleness among 
Indigenous people also needs to make inroads into Indigenous arrest. Education policy 
needs not only to improve the marketability of the Indigenous workforce, but to 
facilitate the citizenship skills required to operate in both the Indigenous and non-
Indigenous domains (see Groome & Hamilton 1995 for an overview). It is important not 
to underestimate the magnitude of the task given that Indigenous youth sub-cultures 
may value resistance to mainstream education above any citizenship skills provided 
(Dawes 2000). This resistance is also outlined in the conflict theories about Indigenous 
involvement in crime (Cunneen 2001).17 
The role of the CDEP scheme in lowering Indigenous arrests relative to the unemployed 
confirms the OEA (1997) analysis, but in a more general setting. The continued 
expansion of the CDEP scheme is likely to play a role in mitigating Indigenous over-
representation in arrest statistics (Hunter & Taylor 2001; Taylor & Hunter 2001). 
The prominence of the correlation between alcohol consumption and Indigenous arrest 
is consistent with findings from the National Police Custody Survey (see AIC 1994). The 
links between alcohol and crime (violence, disorder and acquisitive crime) are well 
documented (see Ramsay 1996 for a review on this topic). The cycle of violence 
perpetuating violence, which ultimately leads to high rates of Indigenous arrest, is 
demonstrated by the significance of the variable capturing whether a respondent had 
been physically attacked or verbally threatened. Substantial progress needs to be made 
on substance abuse problems in Indigenous communities before this cycle of violence 
can be broken. 
Pearson (2000: 16–20) speculates about the impact of alcohol on Cape York Aboriginal 
societies and links this to the ‘poison of welfare dependency’. Martin (2001) criticises 
his focus on reforming the delivery of welfare because it leads him to underestimate 
how deeply alcohol is implicated in the production and reproduction of the problems 
identified. However, there are potential avenues for addressing a crucial structural 
issue in the facilitation of social change, including the supply of alcohol through the 
canteens controlled by the Cape York community councils (Martin 1998).  
This is not the place to review all of the literature on effective alcohol policies for 
Indigenous people (see Brady 2000 for an overview). However, it would be remiss not to 
point out that restricting supply is consistently nominated as producing the most 
tangible results in terms of reducing alcohol-related harm among Indigenous 
Australians (Gray et al. 2000). 
The significance of household factors, such as the quantity and quality of the housing 
stock, points to an obvious avenue for active policy intervention. The intrinsic difficulty 
in measuring and defining income in a cross-cultural setting means that obvious 
indicators of deprivation (such as a decaying housing stock) provide a better signal than 
household income measured against a national benchmark (see Hunter 2001 for a 
description of cross-cultural issues in income measurement). In light of the general 
insignificance of poverty itself as a predictor of arrest, it may be better that housing 
policy focus directly on improving the housing stock in Indigenous communities rather 
than relying solely on welfare transfers so that people could afford adequate housing. 
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Family and social factors are less amenable to direct policy intervention. Indeed, 
misconceived policy interventions that led to the ‘stolen generation’ appear to be a 
major factor underlying Indigenous arrest rates. The negative effects of the policies that 
gave rise to the ‘stolen generation’ is likely to be driven by the traumatic disruption to 
family life and the loss of culturally appropriate parenting skills. A recent government 
report identified several developmental and early intervention approaches to dealing 
with risk factors (as well as outlining protective factors) and associated antisocial and 
criminal behaviour (National Crime Prevention 1999). The factors investigated include: 
child factors, family factors, school context life, life events, and community and cultural 
factors. Unfortunately, while there are over ten thousand early intervention programs 
operating in Australia, it is rare to find any explicit reference to crime prevention and 
consequently conscious strategies to address such problems are absent. 
The National Crime Prevention (1999: 183–5) report also paid considerable attention to 
issues of particular relevance for Indigenous people. In addition to highlighting the role 
of the ‘stolen generation’, it emphasised the importance of Indigenous control over how 
family services are provided, access to education and the need for Indigenous carers for 
Indigenous clients. The report also identified that the special needs of children of 
Indigenous prisoners, especially those from country areas, should be taken into 
account if the risk of delinquent behaviour is to be minimised.   
The inter-relationship of many of the pathologies in Indigenous communities are 
highlighted by the effect of long-term health conditions on arrest. The extensive and 
growing literature on policy debate on Indigenous health needs to be informed by an 
awareness that health outcomes reinforce disadvantage in a range of social indicators 
(Gray et al. 2001; Hunter 2000b; Hunter & Gray 1999).   
Peer groups can also assist in reducing Indigenous arrest rates at the margin. Ensuring 
that people stay away from negative role models appears to be more important than 
providing positive models to look up to. This result highlights the self-reinforcing nature 
of Indigenous arrest and underscores the importance of continued efforts to reduce the 
rate of imprisonment and other sources of negative role models.   
This paper has been careful to distinguish between whether an offence was committed 
and the fact of being arrested. Unfortunately, existing data sources do not permit the 
analyst to separate the offence from the arbitrary actions of certain police or indeed the 
systemic cultural inflexibility of the criminal justice system. The antecedents of arrest 
and how Indigenous people interpret these events are crucial in understanding the role 
that cultural factors might play in the contacts between Indigenous Australians and the 
police (Carcach & Mukherjee 1996). Unfortunately, it is probably unrealistic to expect 
an omnibus survey like the NATSIS to collect data on the perspectives of the various 
actors in this process. In any case, the cross-cultural tensions in reconciling such data 
would probably render any regression-based empirical analysis intractable, 
insignificant or hopelessly biased. In these circumstances, a case study or ethnographic 
approach is more likely to illuminate the issues that need to be addressed by policy 
makers. 
Carcach and Mukherjee (1996) claim that the NATSIS approach to gathering law and 
justice information was too conservative. For example, there were no explicit links 
between the issues of culture, victimisation and deviant behaviour. They conclude that 
future data collections need to focus on issues of crime, violence and family violence. 
The first opportunity to revisit these issues will be when the Indigenous General Social 
Survey (IGSS) is conducted by the ABS in 2002 as it will cover many of the same issues 
addressed in the NATSIS. The advantage of the IGSS is that analogous data may be 
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collected for the non-Indigenous population providing a national benchmark against 
which to compare the Indigenous analysis. Furthermore, the IGSS will be collected 
every six years and the issues flagged above can be re-visited at that time.18 However, it 
is important that our expectations of the IGSS data are not too high as measurement 
error in arrest and various explanatory variables, combined with the intrinsically 
culturally sensitive nature of analysis, means that the empirical analysis of Indigenous 
arrest will continue to be only broadly indicative. Given that causality issues are still 
contestable in academic literature (Murdoch, Pihl & Ross 1990), there is little hope they 
can be easily resolved in a cross-cultural context simply by collecting better and more 
comprehensive data. In the meantime, policy makers will need to content themselves 
with addressing the significant factors identified using the NATSIS data or appropriate 
case studies. 
Appendix A. Sensitivity analysis of the factors underlying 
Indigenous arrest using the publicly available NATSIS data  
This appendix focuses on a sensitivity analysis of the 1997 OEA report on the factors 
underlying arrest among unemployed and employed respondents to the NATSIS (OEA 
1997). The main aim of the sensitivity analysis is to identify whether it is possible to 
use the NATSIS Confidentialised Unit Record File (CURF) to consistently estimate the 
statistical model of arrest without resorting to the master data file, which can only be 
accessed by the ABS staff. Given that the ABS’s master file is the sole means of 
accessing data on the State or Territory in which a respondent resides, this is 
tantamount to a test of the importance of including State-specific institutional factors.19 
That is, if the results do not change significantly after State and Territory factors are 
taken into account, then this provides evidence that the interactions between such 
factors and other predictors can be ignored. In this case, State- or Territory-specific 
factors may still be important, but they do not bias the significance or size of the effect 
of other factors. Indeed, this report provides evidence of the imputed size of such 
effects, where significant, using the OEA results. 
Data and method 
This section discusses the model used in the OEA report, introduces the available data, 
and provides details of the most intuitive means of summarising the effect of various 
factors and whether such effects are sensitive to the inclusion of dummy variables for 
States and Territories. 
The statistical model 
The OEA report uses a logistic analysis of arrest in order to assess whether CDEP 
scheme employment significantly reduces employment relative to the Indigenous 
unemployed. Logistic regressions are often used where the dependent variable has two 
possible values, zero or one—for example, those who were arrested in the previous five 
years versus others who were not. To overcome the fact that this is a limited dependent 
variable, a logit transformation is used to ensure that the predicted probabilities lie 
between zero and one. The basic formulation of the binomial logistic regression model is 
 Logit Pi = log P(1− P)
 
  
 
  i
= bXi + ei  (1) 
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where b is a coefficient vector, the explanatory variables Xi and ei are the error terms 
which approximate a normal distribution. See Agresti (1984) and Hosmer and 
Lemeshow (1989) for fuller discussions. Logit P, which is also known as the log odds 
ratio, is the dependent variable in the logistic regression. The logistic regression models 
are estimated using maximum likelihood estimation techniques.  
The coefficients from the binomial logistic regression can be converted into probability 
values using the formula: 
 ( )i
i
Pit
Pit
e
eP  log
 log
1+=  (2) 
Often the coefficients of the binomial logistic model are interpreted using the log odds 
ratio (e.g., OEA 1997). Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989) show that the log odds, or rather 
the natural log of the odds ratio, equals the individual coefficient of the respective 
variables.20 The coefficients in a logistic model must be interpreted as relative to a 
reference person defined by the omitted categories of the respective groups of 
explanatory variables. The reference person, or base case, in OEA (1997) is an 
unemployed female aged between 15 and 24 years in an Indigenous-only two parent 
family with an income of more than $30,000 per annum, who attends a cultural 
activity, has less than 6 years of formal education, has never consumed alcohol before, 
and lives in a Western Australian rural or remote area. Therefore, if we are interested in 
the affect of being educated to year 12 on the probability of arrest, then a positive 
coefficient implies that arrest is more likely (i.e., there is a higher log odds ratio) among 
Indigenous people who completed secondary school. 
The ‘marginal effect’ of each variable is presented in the text because they are easier to 
interpret than the log odds ratios. The marginal effects give the change in the predicted 
probability of arrest for a given change in the value of a variable, holding the value of 
the other variables constant. For example, how is the probability of being arrested 
affected by being employed in a CDEP scheme? However, the effect of changes in the 
explanatory variables on the probability of being arrested varies with the value of all the 
explanatory variables in the model. Given that the reference person in the OEA report is 
in no way representative of Indigenous unemployed or CDEP scheme participants, the 
marginal effects are estimated using the average characteristics of the sample provided 
in Table A1. Thus calculated, the marginal effect is the change in probability from the 
average rate of arrest in the NATSIS sample (i.e. 33.5 per cent) resulting from a one unit 
change in the variable being examined.21  
Data 
Unlike the OEA (1997), the distributions of all variables used in the following sensitivity 
analysis are reported in Table A1. Such information provides useful benchmarks for the 
reader to interpret the analysis but is also crucial to the calculation and interpretation 
of the marginal effects. These descriptive statistics are roughly consistent with the 
characteristics of NATSIS respondents who were either unemployed or employed in the 
CDEP scheme (ABS/CAEPR 1996; Hunter 1999; Hunter 2000a).  
WORKING PAPER NO. 10 25 
C E N T R E  F O R  A B O R I G I N A L  E C O N O M I C  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H  
Table A1. Summary statistics for replication of the results of the OEA report 
(1997), Indigenous unemployed and CDEP scheme workers, 1994 
Variable Proportion in 
sample 
Standard 
deviation 
Arrested in previous five years 0.335 0.472 
Male 0.606 0.489 
Age 25–34 0.344 0.475 
Age 35–44 0.178 0.383 
Age 45–64 0.108 0.310 
Family with both Indigenous and non-Indigenous members 0.106 0.308 
One parent family 0.088 0.283 
Couple only family 0.141 0.349 
Single, other 0.384 0.486 
Family Income less than $12,000 p.a. 0.125 0.331 
Family Income less than $12,001 to 20,000 p.a. 0.234 0.424 
Family Income less than $20,001 to 30,000 p.a. 0.272 0.445 
CDEP scheme employment 0.388 0.487 
Taken away from natural family 0.086 0.281 
Identifies with tribal groups 0.734 0.442 
Role of elders is important 0.897 0.304 
Attends cultural activity but does not have a place 0.364 0.481 
Does not attend cultural activity  0.194 0.395 
Police station more than 100 km away 0.147 0.354 
Availability of Indigenous police aides 0.675 0.469 
Seven to nine years of schooling 0.447 0.497 
10 to 11 years of schooling 0.411 0.492 
12 years of schooling 0.067 0.250 
Last drank alcohol less than a week ago 0.513 0.500 
Drank more than a week ago 0.327 0.469 
Capital city 0.068 0.252 
Other urban centres 0.475 0.499 
   
N  2,128  
Replicating the OEA report 
The task of replicating the OEA results is made more difficult by the idiosyncracies of 
their analysis. The main issue is that their analysis retains both significant and 
insignificant coefficients in their final results. This may not be important if there is only 
one significant coefficient in a group of dummy variables (i.e., variables which sum to 1 
for all individuals by definition), but can significantly distort the estimates for individual 
coefficients. Given that the inclusion of irrelevant variables may lead to biased results, 
we should exclude variables (or groups of variables) for which there were no significant 
coefficients (Greene 2000). For example, since all family income variables are 
insignificant these variables should all be omitted from the relatively parsimonious 
specification reported in Table A2.  
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The exception to this rule is the variable which captures whether a family contains both 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous members, the so-called ‘mixed family’ variable. The 
rationale for its continued inclusion is that it is likely to pick up the influence of the 
omitted State and Territory variables. The large variation in the number of mixed 
families in the respective States and Territories appears to depend upon the history of 
colonisation with the Northern Territory, Western Australia, South Australia and 
Queensland having relatively few ‘mixed’ families (Ross 1999).  
Table A2 confirms the suspicion that the mixed family variable is a substitute for the 
omitted State and Territory variables. In contrast to OEA (1997), this variable has a 
significant coefficient. Given that the mixed family variable is probably a proxy for the 
omitted State and Territory variables, it should not be interpreted as having an 
independent effect on Indigenous arrest. This caveat should be borne in mind in any 
specification that omits data on the State and Territory of residence.  
Notwithstanding the difficulty with interpreting this coefficient, the OEA estimate of the 
mixed family parameter is within the 95 per cent confidence interval of the estimate in 
our parsimonious regression model. That is, we can be 95 per cent sure that the OEA 
coefficient is within the feasible range estimated on the NATSIS CURF. Therefore the 
point estimate of the mixed family coefficient has not been significantly distorted by the 
focus on a parsimonious model.  
Indeed, none of the coefficients reported in Table A2 are affected by leaving out the 
State and Territory dummy variables or those variables with insignificant coefficients in 
the OEA report. That is, the OEA analysis is not significantly affected by focusing on the 
parsimonious specification. This provides strong evidence that it is possible to proceed 
with a CURF based analysis without resorting to the NATSIS master file.  
Another idiosyncracy of the OEA analysis is that they did not use all available 
information in the NATSIS. For example, the difference in the number of observations 
for the respective specifications in Table A2 is driven by omitting variables (or groups of 
variables) which were not significant in the OEA report.  
The inclusion of the variable measuring the ‘availability of Indigenous police aides’ leads 
to 266 variables being deleted in both specifications because the relevant NATSIS 
responses are either ‘don’t know’ or ‘not stated’. Given the substantial loss of 
information from such omissions it is worth considering constructing another variable 
for the not stated categories of such questions. This will be done in the final report to 
ensure that all useable information has been included.  
The importance of parameters can be measured by both the significance and size of the 
coefficient estimates. Having dealt with the former in Table A2, attention is now turned 
to the latter. As argued above, the size of the logistic coefficient is difficult to interpret 
by itself. A more intuitive approach is to estimate the change in the probability of arrest 
associated with having a particular characteristic relative to some reference person (see 
Table A3). 
The OEA analysis is dominated by the effect of alcohol consumption, which increases 
the probability of arrest by almost one-third. This provides an indication of the 
prominence of drinking-related offences in the Indigenous population (Borland & 
Hunter 1997; Borland & Hunter 2000; Hunter & Borland 1999). 
The other significant positive marginal effects on Indigenous arrest are being male, 
living in a capital city and whether a person was taken away from their natural family 
as a child: all of these variables increasing the prospect of arrest by over 10 percentage 
points.  
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Table A2. Replication of OEA’s (1997) LOGIT estimates of arrest among 
Indigenous unemployed and CDEP workers, 1994  
 OEA (1997) Parsimonious specification on NATSIS 
CURF 
   95% confidence interval 
 Coefficients Coefficients Lower 
bound 
Upper 
bound 
Constant -3.14 -3.17 -3.86 -2.49 
Male 1.30 1.29 1.06 1.51 
Aged between 25 and 34 years 0.12 0.13 -0.10 0.37 
Age between 35 and 44 years -0.26 -0.35 -0.65 -0.06 
Age between 45 and 64 years -1.20 -1.27 -1.69 -0.84 
Both Indigenous and non-Indigenous family members* -0.22 -0.42 -0.76 -0.09 
One parent family 0.25    
Couple only family 0.11    
Single, other 0.12    
Family income less than $12,000 p.a. 0.01    
Family income between $12,001 and $20,000 p.a. 0.14    
Family income between $20,001 and $30,000 p.a. 0.10    
CDEP employment  -0.31 -0.28 -0.51 -0.04 
Taken away from natural family 0.72 0.81 0.46 1.16 
Identifies with tribal groups 0.10    
Role of elders is important -0.14    
Attends cultural activities but does not have a place -0.04    
Does not attend cultural activities -0.02    
Police station more than 100 km away 0.27    
Availability of Indigenous police aides -0.39 -0.32 -0.54 -0.09 
Seven to nine years of schooling 0.14 -0.05 -0.49 0.38 
10 to 11 years of schooling -0.28 -0.44 -0.89 0.02 
12 years of schooling -0.79 -0.95 -1.56 -0.34 
Last drank alcohol less than a week ago 2.55 2.47 1.94 3.01 
Drank alcohol more than a week ago 2.03 2.02 1.48 2.56 
NSW -0.36  NA   
Victoria -0.27  NA   
QLD -0.68  NA   
SA 0.23  NA   
NT -0.41  NA   
Capital city 0.71 0.62 0.20 1.04 
Other urban centres 0.25 0.34 0.09 0.58 
Number of observations  2,063  2,128   
Notes. The reference person (based on omitted categories is: an unemployed female aged between 15 and 
24 years in an Indigenous only two parent family with an income of more than $30,000 p.a., who 
attends a cultural activity, has less than 6 years of formal education, has never consumed alcohol 
before, and lives in a Western Australian rural or remote area. As indicated in the text the dummies 
for the respective States are not available (NA) on the NATSIS CURF. With the exception of the 
variable denoted with an asterisk), the parsimonious specification only includes those variables that 
were significant in OEA (1997) 
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Table A3. Significant changes in probability of arrest (%) implied by OEA 
(1997) LOGIT estimates  
 Probability 
of arrest 
Marginal 
 effect 
Average probability of being arrested in the previous five 
years, if in the NATSIS sub-sample 
33.5  
Significant marginal effects ranked by magnitude   
Age 45 to 64 years 14.7 -18.8 
12 years of schooling 19.4 -14.1 
QLD 20.4 -13.2 
NSW 26.0 -7.5 
CDEP employment 29.4 -4.1 
Availability of Indigenous police aides 30.8 -2.8 
Male 45.7 12.2 
Taken away from natural family 49.3 15.8 
Capital city 49.4 15.9 
Last drank alcohol less than a week ago 63.6 30.1 
Drank alcohol more than a week ago 66.4 32.9 
Notes.  Marginal effect is the effect of having a particular characteristic relative to the reference 
characteristics listed in the notes of the previous table. For example, being aged between 45 and 64 
years is associated with a 18.8 percentage point lower probability of arrest relative to youth aged 
between 15 and 24 years. All other variables are measured at the mean when calculating a marginal 
effect. It is not possible to estimate the standard error of the marginal effects using the delta method 
because insufficient information was provided in the OEA report (Greene 1997: 297). A marginal effect 
is included in this table only if the coefficient from which it is derived is significantly different from 
zero at the 5% level.  
While being employed in a CDEP scheme tends to reduce arrest, it does so by only a 
small amount (see the OEA report for a detailed analysis of the effect of CDEP). 
Similarly the availability of Indigenous police aides has only a small effect on the arrest 
rate.  
The coefficients for State and Territory variables are particularly interesting given that it 
will not be possible to analyse their influence using the NATSIS CURF. Both New South 
Wales and Queensland have significantly lower rates of arrest with the residents being 
7.5 and 13.2 percentage points less likely, respectively, to have been arrested than the 
average person in the sample. The marginal effects for the other States are based on 
insignificant coefficients. If these results translate into the estimates for the overall 
NATSIS sample, that is not just based on the unemployed and CDEP scheme employed 
in NATSIS, then we should expect the probability of arrest in the main report to be 
similarly depressed. These results can be interpreted as indicating State-specific 
factors, possibly related to the way the respective laws are policed, which are reducing 
the probability of Indigenous arrest. Unfortunately, it is not possible to eliminate the 
possibility that some non-institutional factors or unmeasured variation in relevant 
factors across these States is leading to lower arrest rates. In terms of the proposed 
analysis of the NATSIS CURF this last issue can be dealt with by an improved 
specification which includes more relevant, significant and appropriate (from a 
criminological point of view) variables in the estimated model. 
Of the factors that significantly reduce arrest, only the education variable presents a 
viable policy instrument. While older Indigenous respondents have the least chance of 
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arrest, age is not something which can be altered by administrative fiat. However, 
increasing the retention rate so that more Indigenous students complete secondary 
school (i.e., having 12 years of schooling compared to those who spend less than 6 
years in education), policy-makers will substantially reduce the number of Indigenous 
people being arrested. 
Concluding remarks 
To be fair, the OEA (1997) report was not designed to accurately summarise all the 
factors underlying Indigenous arrest as its sole focus was on the CDEP scheme. 
Notwithstanding, the results based on the NATSIS CURF appear to be insensitive to the 
inclusion of the State and Territory dummy variables. That is, using an otherwise 
identical specification to that used in the OEA (1997) report, the size and significance of 
the effect of the major factors underlying arrest among Indigenous unemployed and 
CDEP scheme workers remain largely unchanged.  
Therefore, the analysis can proceed using the publicly available NATSIS data. Given 
that the geographic dimension (at least of State or Territory of residence) is adequately 
controlled for by other publicly-available variables and that interaction effects are 
unlikely to be important, the analysis of the number of arrests in the previous five years 
and the reason for the last arrest can also proceed using the NATSIS CURF. 
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Appendix B. Modelling arrest among all NATSIS respondents 
Table B1. Variable definitions in alphabetical order. 
Variable 
name 
Description  
Dependent variables 
ARRESTED Whether arrested in previous five years  
ASSAULT Last arrest for assault  
DRINKARR Last arrest for drink driving or public drunkenness  
THEFT Last arrest for theft  
Explanatory variables 
AGE1317 Aged between 13 and 17 
AGE2534 Aged between 25 and 34 
AGE3544 Aged between 35 and 44 
AGE45P Aged between 45 years and over 
ARRESTOH Other household members arrested in last 5 years 
CAPCITY Live in a capital city 
CDEP Work in a Community Development Employment Projects scheme 
CROWDEDH An average of more than 2 persons per bedroom in the house 
DEPENDTS Living in family with at least one dependent 
DRINK A person has drunk alcohol at least once in lifetime 
HEALTH Has had a health problem for more than 6 months  
HOUSEOK Household utilities (including electricity, gas, water, sewerage, running water, 
toilets and bathroom) are both available and working 
INDIGPOL Indigenous police aides/liaison officers in community  
INDPOLNS Question about Indigenous police aides not completed 
MIXEDF Lives in family with non-Indigenous persons  
NEARPOL Lives within 50 kilometres of police station 
NILF Not in the labour force 
REMOTE Lives in rural non-remote area (less than 100 kilometres from a TAFE institution)  
RURAL Lives in a rural remote area (more than 100 kilometres from a TAFE institution)  
SCHNSNA Question about highest level of schooling completed either not stated or not 
applicable 
SEX Male 
TAKEN Taken away from natural family 
TSI Torres Strait Islander 
UNEMP Unemployed 
VICTIM Victim of crime (physically attacked or verbally threatened) 
VOTEDOH Other household members voted in either recent Federal, State or ATSIC election 
YEAR1011 Highest level of schooling completed—year 10 or 11  
YEAR12 Completed year 12 schooling  
YEAR6TO9 Highest level of schooling completed—years 6 to 9  
Variables used but were not significantly different from zero at 5% level in any regression 
HINCMISS Income data not available for all household members 
POORHH Household income less than 50% of estimated median of OECD equivalent 
household income from the 1994–95, Survey of Income and Housing Costs 
QNONE No post-school qualification  
STILLSCH Still at school 
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Table B2. Summary statistics of variables used in regression, NATSIS 
respondents aged 13 year and over in 1994  
 Females Males Aged 13 
to 17 
Aged 18 & 
over 
All 
respondents 
Dependent variables      
ARRESTED 0.092 0.258 0.076 0.191 0.170 
DRINKARR 0.048 0.150 0.012 0.114 0.096 
ASSAULT 0.016 0.045 0.009 0.034 0.030 
THEFT 0.009 0.041 0.039 0.020 0.024 
OUTSWARR 0.011 0.043 0.008 0.030 0.026 
Explanatory variables      
SEX 0.000 1.000 0.529 0.460 0.472 
TSI 0.070 0.073 0.066 0.073 0.072 
AGE1317 0.160 0.200 1.000 0.000 0.179 
AGE2534 0.262 0.248 0.000 0.311 0.256 
AGE3544 0.172 0.163 0.000 0.204 0.168 
AGE45P 0.205 0.203 0.000 0.249 0.204 
CAPCITY 0.128 0.116 0.146 0.117 0.122 
RURAL 0.166 0.188 0.202 0.171 0.176 
REMOTE 0.226 0.244 0.187 0.245 0.235 
INDIGPOL 0.507 0.481 0.408 0.514 0.495 
INDPOLNS 0.208 0.230 0.300 0.200 0.218 
NEARPOL 0.852 0.838 0.879 0.838 0.845 
CDEP 0.077 0.149 0.042 0.126 0.111 
UNEMP 0.144 0.214 0.090 0.196 0.177 
NILF 0.613 0.408 0.830 0.448 0.516 
YEAR6TO9 0.335 0.343 0.102 0.390 0.339 
YEAR1011 0.320 0.274 0.113 0.338 0.298 
YEAR12 0.066 0.048 0.010 0.067 0.057 
SCHNSNA 0.016 0.011 0.001 0.016 0.014 
DRINK 0.628 0.780 0.269 0.794 0.700 
VICTIM 0.114 0.111 0.099 0.115 0.112 
HEALTH 0.381 0.303 0.230 0.368 0.344 
MIXEDF 0.177 0.182 0.241 0.166 0.180 
DEPENDTS 0.540 0.425 0.414 0.501 0.485 
TAKEN 0.073 0.070 0.026 0.082 0.072 
CROWDEDH 0.334 0.347 0.385 0.330 0.340 
HOUSEOK 0.772 0.764 0.790 0.763 0.768 
ARRESTOH 0.277 0.299 0.454 0.251 0.287 
VOTEDOH 0.430 0.469 0.277 0.486 0.449 
Number of observations  5,402  4,833  1,832  8,403 10,235 
Note: The descriptive statistics are unweighted and consequently only reflect the characteristics of the 
NATSIS sample used in the regression analysis.  
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Table B3. Probit estimates of arrest by broad age groups 
 Aged 13 to 17 years  Aged 18 years and over 
Variables Coef. Std. Err Coef. Std. Err 
SEX 0.780* 0.118 0.731* 0.041 
TSI -0.632* 0.315 -0.667* 0.098 
AGE2534  NA  NA -0.026 0.047 
AGE3544  NA  NA -0.319* 0.056 
AGE45P  NA  NA -0.724* 0.066 
CAPCITY 0.426* 0.145 0.176* 0.060 
RURAL -0.192 0.156 -0.226* 0.056 
REMOTE -0.373 0.207 -0.253* 0.064 
INDIGPOL -0.056 0.126 -0.094* 0.044 
INDPOLNS -0.414* 0.149 -0.560* 0.064 
NEARPOL 0.099 0.220 -0.290* 0.069 
CDEP 0.008 0.277 0.416* 0.067 
UNEMP 0.264 0.233 0.628* 0.054 
NILF 0.199 0.224 0.279* 0.056 
YEAR6TO9 0.798* 0.153 0.467* 0.068 
YEAR1011 0.299 0.184 0.309* 0.073 
YEAR12 0.298 0.413 0.034 0.103 
SCHNSNA  NA  NA 0.544* 0.158 
DRINK 0.923* 0.121 0.980* 0.075 
VICTIM 0.308* 0.148 0.524* 0.050 
HEALTH 0.127 0.122 0.145* 0.041 
MIXEDF -0.591* 0.132 -0.086 0.054 
DEPENDTS -0.006 0.117 -0.057 0.043 
TAKEN 0.514* 0.244 0.239* 0.061 
CROWDEDH 0.190 0.124 0.138* 0.043 
HOUSEOK -0.413* 0.127 -0.138* 0.045 
ARRESTOH -0.030 0.107 0.238* 0.042 
VOTEDOH -0.144 0.126 -0.085* 0.042 
CONSTANT -2.336* 0.359 -2.158* 0.147 
Pseudo R2 0.290  0.237  
Log Likelihood  -351   -3,124  
Number of 
observations 
 1,830   8,403  
Note:  Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors used. An asterisk denotes that a statistic is significantly 
different from zero at the 5 per cent level. The variable SCHNSNA and two observations were dropped 
from the regression for minors because both were both arrested and hence this predicts the model 
perfectly if included.  
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Table B4. Probit estimates of arrest among Indigenous males 
 ARRESTED DRINKARR ASSAULT THEFT 
TSI -0.656* 0.113 -0.699* 0.137 -0.320 0.199 -0.734* 0.272 
AGE1317 -0.329* 0.094 -0.949* 0.147 -0.281 0.156 0.443* 0.136 
AGE2534 -0.032 0.063 0.122 0.069 0.096 0.091 -0.280* 0.101 
AGE3544 -0.402* 0.074 -0.076 0.081 -0.344* 0.117 -0.999* 0.163 
AGE45P -0.824* 0.082 -0.450* 0.090 -0.432* 0.129 -1.304* 0.218 
CAPCITY 0.160* 0.074 -0.010 0.091 -0.063 0.120 0.046 0.117 
RURAL -0.241* 0.068 -0.177* 0.077 -0.420* 0.120 -0.426* 0.123 
REMOTE -0.331* 0.076 -0.196* 0.084 -0.228* 0.116 -0.517* 0.132 
INDIGPOL -0.115* 0.054 -0.101 0.060 -0.156* 0.081 -0.076 0.090 
INDPOLNS -0.609* 0.073 -0.539* 0.090 -0.462* 0.128 -0.445* 0.131 
NEARPOL -0.255* 0.079 -0.365* 0.087 -0.140 0.119 -0.199 0.144 
CDEP 0.401* 0.077 0.315* 0.085 0.269* 0.118 -0.079 0.148 
UNEMP 0.595* 0.064 0.384* 0.072 0.299* 0.096 0.349* 0.113 
NILF 0.291* 0.074 0.146 0.084 0.049 0.122 0.309* 0.136 
YEAR6TO9 0.507* 0.077 0.245* 0.088 0.489* 0.138 0.760* 0.145 
YEAR1011 0.364* 0.082 0.192* 0.096 0.323* 0.148 0.390* 0.156 
YEAR12 -0.039 0.127 -0.085 0.148 0.075 0.229 0.315 0.221 
SCHNSNA 0.425 0.217 0.230 0.228 -0.187 0.446 0.395 0.484 
DRINK 0.927* 0.083 1.346* 0.181 0.549* 0.155 0.614* 0.132 
VICTIM 0.562* 0.065 0.469* 0.069 0.311* 0.087 0.268* 0.100 
HEALTH 0.161* 0.052 0.090 0.058 0.185* 0.079 -0.009 0.088 
MIXEDF -0.150* 0.064 -0.115 0.077 -0.075 0.103 -0.226* 0.113 
DEPENDTS 0.002 0.051 -0.037 0.058 0.049 0.083 -0.163 0.087 
TAKEN 0.330* 0.080 0.207* 0.085 0.197 0.117 0.182 0.149 
CROWDEDH 0.106* 0.052 0.181* 0.057 0.092 0.081 0.082 0.088 
HOUSEOK -0.248* 0.056 -0.064 0.062 -0.083 0.083 -0.363* 0.087 
ARRESTOH 0.230* 0.051 0.189* 0.059 0.178* 0.077 0.174* 0.080 
VOTEDOH -0.082 0.050 -0.101 0.057 0.119 0.078 -0.008 0.082 
CONSTANT -1.289* 0.166 -2.041* 0.237 -2.356* 0.276 -2.017* 0.282 
Pseudo R2 0.226  0.203  0.147  0.206  
Log Likelihood  -2,137   -1,628   -756   -651  
 Note:  Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors used. An asterisk denotes that a statistic is significantly 
different from zero at the 5 per cent level.  
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Table B5. Probit estimates of arrest among Indigenous females 
 ARRESTED DRINKARR ASSAULT THEFT 
TSI -0.620* 0.161 -0.403* 0.194 -0.337 0.256 -0.161 0.342 
AGE1317 -0.298* 0.124 -0.522* 0.186 -0.304 0.237 0.504* 0.236 
AGE2534 -0.025 0.071 0.001 0.089 -0.042 0.116 -0.162 0.148 
AGE3544 -0.228* 0.085 -0.098 0.103 -0.288 0.147 -0.843* 0.259 
AGE45P -0.600* 0.105 -0.455* 0.127 -0.813* 0.215 -0.860* 0.372 
CAPCITY 0.265* 0.082 0.218* 0.109 0.045 0.137 0.388* 0.165 
RURAL -0.207* 0.088 -0.117 0.106 -0.210 0.150 -0.088 0.189 
REMOTE -0.159 0.100 0.026 0.117 -0.080 0.183 -0.276 0.234 
INDIGPOL -0.044 0.065 -0.105 0.078 -0.170 0.100 -0.413* 0.140 
INDPOLNS -0.426* 0.094 -0.672* 0.132 -0.410* 0.156 -0.341 0.202 
NEARPOL -0.273* 0.112 -0.200 0.129 -0.085 0.209 -0.055 0.263 
CDEP 0.404* 0.125 0.523* 0.148 -0.038 0.229 0.333 0.358 
UNEMP 0.658* 0.097 0.618* 0.124 0.366* 0.161 0.593* 0.273 
NILF 0.329* 0.090 0.363* 0.116 0.156 0.152 0.364 0.255 
YEAR6TO9 0.402* 0.097 0.273* 0.125 0.340 0.182 0.619* 0.253 
YEAR1011 0.179 0.103 0.014 0.134 -0.031 0.198 0.513* 0.247 
YEAR12 0.090 0.144 -0.065 0.183 -0.011 0.268 0.044 0.428 
SCHNSNA 0.599* 0.204 0.526* 0.255   0.959* 0.480 
DRINK 0.965* 0.087 1.413* 0.147 0.785* 0.190 0.569* 0.207 
VICTIM 0.440* 0.071 0.343* 0.087 0.381* 0.110 0.294* 0.145 
HEALTH 0.109 0.057 0.044 0.074 0.255* 0.096 0.092 0.124 
MIXEDF -0.187* 0.082 -0.238* 0.108 0.100 0.128 -0.502* 0.211 
DEPENDTS -0.095 0.065 -0.155* 0.079 -0.120 0.118 0.372* 0.149 
TAKEN 0.176 0.091 -0.060 0.119 -0.056 0.161 0.285 0.193 
CROWDEDH 0.197* 0.066 0.194* 0.079 0.214* 0.118 0.239 0.134 
HOUSEOK -0.045 0.069 -0.053 0.083 0.025 0.122 0.246 0.177 
ARRESTOH 0.152* 0.061 0.231* 0.073 0.115 0.101 0.194 0.145 
VOTEDOH -0.064 0.063 0.004 0.079 0.080 0.104 0.027 0.141 
CONSTANT -2.229* 0.212 -2.978* 0.286 -2.899* 0.392 -3.887* 0.492 
Pseudo R2 0.190  0.204  0.161  0.195  
Log Likelihood  -1,342   -822   -381   -213  
 Note:  Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors used. An asterisk denotes that a statistic is significantly 
different from zero at the 5 per cent level. The variable SCHNSNA and 86 observations were dropped 
from the assault regression because they would predict the model perfectly if included.  
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 Table B6. Probit estimates of Indigenous arrest, 1994 
 ARRESTED DRINKARR ASSAULT THEFT 
sex 0.738* 0.038 0.606* 0.045 0.402* 0.063 0.706* 0.076 
tsi -0.660* 0.094 -0.616* 0.115 -0.318 0.162 -0.576* 0.230 
age1317 -0.294* 0.074 -0.808* 0.120 -0.284* 0.131 0.428* 0.117 
age2534 -0.030 0.047 0.074 0.054 0.045 0.071 -0.242* 0.083 
age3544 -0.323* 0.056 -0.082 0.063 -0.321* 0.093 -0.969* 0.138 
age45p -0.736* 0.065 -0.451* 0.073 -0.553* 0.110 -1.220* 0.189 
capcity 0.209* 0.055 0.076 0.070 -0.011 0.091 0.164 0.096 
rural -0.222* 0.053 -0.151* 0.062 -0.340* 0.095 -0.326* 0.104 
remote -0.268* 0.061 -0.126 0.069 -0.180 0.099 -0.449* 0.112 
indigpol -0.089* 0.041 -0.104* 0.047 -0.153* 0.063 -0.164* 0.076 
indpolns -0.539* 0.058 -0.580* 0.074 -0.453* 0.101 -0.401* 0.113 
nearpol -0.266* 0.065 -0.318* 0.073 -0.118 0.104 -0.180 0.123 
cdep 0.393* 0.065 0.344* 0.072 0.215* 0.103 0.026 0.135 
unemp 0.603* 0.053 0.430* 0.061 0.308* 0.083 0.391* 0.102 
nilf 0.281* 0.054 0.176* 0.063 0.081 0.091 0.336* 0.110 
year6to9 0.484* 0.060 0.257* 0.072 0.415* 0.112 0.725* 0.124 
year1011 0.305* 0.064 0.124 0.077 0.175 0.121 0.439* 0.130 
year12 0.042 0.096 -0.086 0.115 0.036 0.176 0.263 0.194 
schnsna 0.545* 0.154 0.376* 0.176 -0.375 0.405 0.672* 0.358 
drink 0.935* 0.060 1.362* 0.116 0.681* 0.117 0.591* 0.114 
victim 0.501* 0.047 0.410* 0.054 0.337* 0.068 0.269* 0.081 
health 0.138* 0.038 0.076 0.046 0.212* 0.061 0.040 0.073 
mixedf -0.156* 0.050 -0.149* 0.062 -0.013 0.082 -0.304* 0.098 
dependts -0.044 0.040 -0.079 0.047 -0.010 0.068 -0.033 0.071 
taken 0.257* 0.059 0.114 0.068 0.112 0.093 0.213 0.119 
crowdedh 0.142* 0.041 0.187* 0.047 0.139* 0.067 0.108 0.075 
houseok -0.165* 0.043 -0.057 0.050 -0.044 0.069 -0.211* 0.076 
arrestoh 0.199* 0.039 0.202* 0.046 0.147* 0.062 0.183* 0.070 
votedoh -0.070 0.039 -0.057 0.046 0.110 0.063 0.000 0.070 
CONSTANT -2.108 0.133 -2.715* 0.177 -2.830* 0.228 -2.953* 0.245 
Pseudo R2 0.252  0.236  0.167  0.229  
Log Likelihood  -3,496   -2,471   -1,146   -884  
 Notes:  Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors used. An asterisk denotes that a statistic is significantly 
different from zero at the 5 per cent level. The coefficients for the analysis of outstanding warrants are 
omitted because of lack of space, but are available on request. 
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Appendix C. Factors underlying multiple arrests 
As well as experiencing high rates of arrest, Indigenous people are also likely to be 
arrested repeatedly. The profile of arrest in the NATSIS shows that once an Indigenous 
person has been arrested, on average they can expect to be arrested at least once 
more—with the average number of arrests ranging between 2.3 and 3.0 (for females and 
males, respectively). This Appendix describes multiple arrests among NATSIS 
respondents and then estimates several statistical models in order to identify the 
factors associated with being arrested more than once.  
Table C1 describes the distribution of multiple arrests by basic demographic 
characteristics (i.e., age and sex). It re-presents the data in Table 2 in a different format 
so as to introduce the relevant issues involved in an empirical analysis of number of 
arrests. Consequently, the basic story that there is an inverted U relationship between 
age and number of arrests with the old and young tending to have relatively low rates of 
multiple arrests. Females tend to have fewer repeated experiences of arrest compared to 
males with 4.2 per cent as opposed to 17.1 per cent having been arrested two or more 
times. The ratio of male to female with multiple arrests is slightly higher than the 
analogous ratio of the simple arrest rates in the NATSIS where males tend to be about 
three to four times more likely to have been arrested than females. 
These differences are exaggerated at the extremes of the distribution where males are 
over than six times more likely than females to have been arrested ten or more times in 
the last five years (3.1 per cent compared to 0.5 per cent). Similarly, minors and people 
aged 45 years and over were between six and seven times more likely to be in the top 
category for number of arrests.  
Table C1. Distribution of number of arrests by age and sex (%) 
 Number of arrests in last five years   
 0 1 2–4 5–9 10 or 
more 
Total 
Age       
13–17 years 92.6 3.2 2.7 0.9 0.6 100.0 
18–24 years 73.4 9.4 11.0 2.4 3.8 100.0 
25–34  years 73.6 11.0 10.5 2.8 2.0 100.0 
35–44  years 81.8 8.7 6.6 1.3 1.5 100.0 
Aged 45 and over 92.3 3.9 2.5 0.7 0.5 100.0 
Sex       
Males 72.6 10.3 11.0 2.9 3.1 100.0 
Females 90.8 5.0 3.2 0.6 0.5 100.0 
Persons 82.1 7.5 6.9 1.7 1.7 100.0 
The relatively large number of Indigenous people in various sub-populations who have 
been arrested ten or more times has important implications for the modelling the 
number of arrests. It is not appropriate to conduct a simple OLS regression because we 
do not know the exact number of arrests that people in this category have had in the 
last five years. In technical terms, the dependent variable is left censored. 
Consequently, OLS techniques will be sensitive to whether we assume that such people 
had been arrested ten times or 20 times in the last five years. One alternative is to 
conduct a Tobit model, a variant of an OLS model, where truncated observations are 
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allowed to take a range of feasible values. Johnston and DiNardo (1997: 436–41) 
provide an introductory description of Tobit and related models. Given that the number 
of arrests takes on integer values only, it may be necessary to consider some 
generalisations of the Tobit model (Amemiya 1984). However, there was no substantive 
difference in the overall conclusions drawn from adopting a Tobit modelor some 
generalisation of it, especially at a broad level of comparison. 
Table C2. Tobit regression analysis of number of Indigenous arrests, 1994 
 Coefficient 
estimate 
Standard error T-ratio 
Male 3.238 0.170 19.0 
Torres Strait Islander -2.680 0.401 -6.7 
Aged between 13 and 17 -1.228 0.316 -3.9 
Aged between 25 and 34 -0.375 0.198 -1.9 
Aged between 35 and 44 -1.477 0.236 -6.3 
Aged between 45 years and over -3.308 0.280 -11.8 
Live in a capital city 0.900 0.229 3.9 
Rural area  -0.969 0.229 -4.2 
Remote area  -1.161 0.272 -4.3 
Indigenous police aides in community  -0.579 0.172 -3.4 
Within 50 kilometres of police station -1.067 0.288 -3.7 
Work in CDEP scheme 1.746 0.277 6.3 
Unemployed 2.465 0.226 10.9 
Not in the labour force 1.285 0.232 5.5 
Completed 6 to 9 years of schooling  2.129 0.252 8.4 
Completed year 10 or 11  1.291 0.270 4.8 
Completed year 12 0.119 0.410 0.3 
Has drunk alcohol at least once 4.180 0.274 15.2 
Physically attacked or verbally threatened 2.263 0.196 11.5 
Long-term health condition 0.648 0.162 4.0 
Lives with non-Indigenous persons  -0.869 0.216 -4.0 
Living in family with at least 1 dependent -0.228 0.167 -1.4 
Taken away from natural family 1.248 0.251 5.0 
Crowded house 0.679 0.172 3.9 
Household utilities available and working -0.470 0.180 -2.6 
Other householders arrested 0.872 0.166 5.2 
Other householders voted -0.239 0.166 -1.4 
Constant -9.700 0.594 -16.3 
Pseudo-R2 0.146   
Number of observations  10,199   
Note:  The Tobit model used also assumes that people with no arrests are left-censored—in effect, assuming 
that some people may expect to have a negative number of arrests. This is a latent variable model 
which assumes that people have a propensity to be arrested a certain number of times. That is, it 
allows the statistical model to distinguish people who are very unlikely to be arrested from those who 
just happened not to be. In total, 8,492 respondents were left-censored (had not been arrested) and 
123 respondents were right-censored (had been arrested ten or more times). The remaining 
respondents were not censored by the way the question was asked in NATSIS. All 158 prisoners were 
excluded. 
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To be consistent with the above analysis, the same set of explanatory variables is used 
to analyse the factors underlying the number of Indigenous arrests. To retain 
comparability with Table 4 prisoners are excluded from the analysis of Table C2. The 
Tobit coefficients can be interpreted as the additional number of arrests a person can 
expect if they have a particular characteristic, holding all other explanatory variables 
constant. For example, Indigenous males can expect to be arrested on 3.2 more 
occasions than Indigenous females. The t-ratios are provided as an indicator of 
significance of the various parameters—the rule of thumb being that any statistic 
greater than two indicates a significant coefficient (i.e., at the 5 per cent level). 
In order of magnitude, the largest impacts on the number of arrests are from the 
alcohol variable, followed by age, sex, whether a Torres Strait Islander, labour force 
status, whether physically attacked or verbally threatened and schooling. With the 
exception of the Torres Strait Islander variable all of these were among the six most 
significant factors identified in Table 4. This provides an indication that Torres Strait 
Islanders are much less likely to have multiple experiences of arrest, at least in the 
NATSIS sample. 
The main thing that arises from Table C2 is that all the factors underlying arrest are 
more significant than those in Table 4 (i.e., they have a higher t-statistic). This should 
not be seen as surprising since the information on whether a person was arrested is a 
subset of the number of arrests. The Tobit analysis is giving more weight to people who 
have been arrested many times and hence any factors associated with such people will 
be highlighted. 
Indeed, only two variables had a negligible or insignificant effect on the number of 
arrests including: the proxies for positive peer group effects in the household, and 
whether a respondent lived in a family with at least one dependent. Again this is very 
similar to the analysis of Table 4, which found these variables only became significant 
at the five per cent level when prisoners were included in the analysis.  
In order to ensure that the empirical results are robust, another alternative statistical 
model which takes into account the fact that the number of arrests is provided as count 
data with a preponderance of zeros and small integer values (i.e., arrest is still a 
relatively rare occurrence for many Indigenous people). In such cases, Greene (1997: 
931) suggests that using the Poisson regression model will improve on standard linear 
techniques such as Tobit. Given that the Poisson distribution assumes that the mean 
and variance of the distribution being examined are equal, the negative binomial model 
is frequently used when there is more variation than would be expected for a Poisson 
process (i.e., the problem of overdispersion). This was indeed the case for the NATSIS 
data on the number of arrest and a negative binomial model was estimated to test the 
sensitivity of the tobit results. Again, the results did not change substantially. The only 
difference of note was that the housing quality coefficient was no longer significant at 
the five per cent level, but was still significant at the 10 per cent level.  
In summary, the analysis of the number of arrests confirms the pattern of significance 
(and relative magnitudes) of the factors underlying Indigenous arrests. Not only are 
economic, alcohol-related, demographic, geographic, and human capital factors 
important, but the probability of arrest is also strongly related to a person’s family, 
housing stock and socioeconomic environment. 
WORKING PAPER NO. 10 39 
C E N T R E  F O R  A B O R I G I N A L  E C O N O M I C  P O L I C Y  R E S E A R C H  
 
Notes 
1. The recommendations emphasised the need to reduce the disproportionate levels of 
Aboriginal persons in custody, rather than the need to directly prevent their deaths. This 
emphasis arose out of the Royal Commission’s conclusion that the 99 Aboriginal deaths in 
custody which occurred during the 1980s were not a result of Aboriginal persons being any 
more likely than others to die in custody, but were a result of their gross over-representation 
in prison. 
2. See Broadhurst et al. (1994) and Cunneen and McDonald (1997). 
3. The CDEP scheme is a Federal government program in which unemployed Indigenous people 
forgo their entitlements to Newstart Allowance payments but receive the equivalent from a 
local community organisation in return for work. It is distinguished from the work-for-the-
dole scheme in having a much longer history (beginning in 1977), in being specific to 
Indigenous communities, and having a broader community-development component. 
4. Appendix A provides a detailed analysis of the OEA report, including a test of whether the 
results are sensitive to the inclusion of State-specific institutional factors, and hence 
whether it is possible to use publicly available NATSIS data.  
5. Prisoners were included in the descriptive statistics in this section because the data on 
demographics and arrest appears to be of reasonable quality. 
6. Preliminary analysis revealed there was no significant loss of information by collapsing two 
variables that broadly measured the frequency of alcohol consumption into one variable. 
That is, there is no significant gain in distinguishing frequent drinkers (defined as those who 
drank in last week) from less frequent drinkers in any of the regressions examined. 
7. The OECD scale is described in full in Mitchell (1991). It gives a weight of one to the first 
adult, 0.7 to the second and subsequent adults and 0.5 to all dependents. 
8. Depending on the age of criminal responsibility in the various States people under this age 
can be, and are, arrested.  
9. For more details on the characteristics of the population in jail at the survey date, see 
Carcach and Mukherjee (1996). 
10. Official police data show that in each year from 1990 to 1994 total arrests were 15.9 per 
cent, 16.9 per cent, 15.9 per cent, 15.6 per cent, and 15.9 per cent of the Indigenous 
population in Western Australia (Ferrante & Loh 1996: 39). To make the official police data 
comparable with the NATSIS data it is necessary to convert the annual percentages to an 
estimate of the proportion of the Indigenous population arrested over the previous five years. 
This calculation is made by summing total arrests as a percentage of the Indigenous 
population across the five-year period from 1990 to 1994, and then adjusting to take 
account of persons who were arrested multiple times throughout the period. The adjustment 
uses a measure of the average number of arrests per arrested person over the previous five 
years in Western Australia derived from the NATSIS data (3.3 arrests). This method of 
calculation provides an estimate from the official police data of the proportion of Indigenous 
persons arrested in Western Australia between 1990 and 1994 of 24.6 per cent. 
11. Note that no account is taken of the possibility that some persons living in Western Australia 
at the time of the NATSIS had been arrested in other States, or that some persons recorded 
in official police data as having been arrested in Western Australia during 1990 to 1993 were 
no longer living in Western Australia in 1994. However, inter-State mobility is generally fairly 
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low—for example, Taylor and Bell (1996: 397) report that only 5.1 per cent of the Indigenous 
population moved between States from 1986 to 1991. 
12. That is, instruments must be, in econometric language, both ‘valid’ and ‘identified’. 
13. For example, Taylor and Bell (1996) using 54 Census Statistical Divisions found that about 
47 per cent of the Indigenous population changed residence between 1986 and 1991. 
14. The large variation in the number of mixed families in the respective States and Territories 
appears to depend upon the history of colonisation, with the Northern Territory, Western 
Australia, South Australia and Queensland having relatively few ‘mixed’ families (Ross 1999). 
15. Note that more than one reason for the last arrest may be given by NATSIS respondents.  
16. For example, the National Police Custody Surveys conducted by the AIC in 1988, 1992 and 
1995 showed that Indigenous Australians were between 26 and 27 times more likely to be 
taken into police custody than other Australians (AIC 1994). On the other hand, data from 
the National Prison Census (AIC 1982–1993) showed Indigenous people as being 13 or 14 
times more likely to be in prison than the rest of the population. 
17. The essential theme of conflict theory is that the legitimacy of the law is rejected by the 
‘outside group’ because it fails to recognise or represent their values. Recent revisions of 
Australian history, which emphasise the struggle between races over land use, have acted as 
a stimulus to conflict theories of Indigenous arrest (Reynolds 1982). Anthropological studies 
show that ongoing cultural conflict can lead to profound differences in legal sensibilities as 
to the content of the law and the basis of collecting evidence (Poole 1986). While the 
occasional riot in country towns gives the impression of rebellion or protest, cultural conflict 
is likely to be a subtle problem, which may not be overtly evident. 
18. A General Social Survey, which includes non-Indigenous people, will be conducted every 
three years from 2002. 
19. Apart from the broad ‘Part-of-State’ variable, all detailed geographic information was 
suppressed by the ABS to protect the confidentiality of respondents. Virtually no other 
information was suppressed. 
20. See Hosmer and Lemeshow (1989) for details of the interpretation of these ratios. 
21. All the variables used in the OEA report are dummy variables, which vary between zero and 
one.  
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